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Executive summary 
The global economic and financial crisis erupted in late 2008 while many developing 
countries were still suffering from the effects of the fuel and food price crisis of 2007, 
raising fears that the latest crisis would exacerbate the effects of the fuel and food crisis, 
and lead to significant increases in poverty and higher rates of unemployment worldwide. 
Soon after the financial crisis hit, a lot was published about the degree to which it was 
affecting developing countries and their populations.  
Three years after the peak of the global economic and financial crisis, our understanding 
of its microeconomic effects in developing countries remains limited. Literature on its 
macroeconomic effects generally concludes that developing countries were able to over-
come the economic shock fairly quickly and that there are only a few signs of serious last-
ing effects. But some authors, who have assessed the micro-level effects of the crisis on 
vulnerable groups in developing countries, discovered considerable losses of income and 
warn of second-round effects in developing countries with lasting consequences for gen-
eral wellbeing. Both the existing micro- and the macroeconomic approaches have draw-
backs that seriously limit our understanding of the microeconomic effects of the global 
crisis in developing countries. 
This paper presents new evidence regarding the short-term microeconomic effects of the 
global economic and financial crisis in selected developing countries. It is divided into two 
main parts. The first part re-examines evidence about the channels of transmission of the 
global crisis and its immediate macroeconomic effects on developing countries. It also pro-
vides quantitative evidence about the relevance of each channel in transmitting the crisis 
worldwide and in particular, to developing countries. The second part of the paper analyses 
short-term effects of the crisis on households in three developing countries: El Salvador, Taji-
kistan and Cambodia. It provides evidence that is nationally representative showing which 
population groups were most affected by the crisis and the comparative effectiveness of na-
tional response strategies in protecting households from its adverse consequences. The paper 
concludes with suggestions about designing social protection schemes that could cushion the 
micro-level effects of economic crises in developing countries.  
The economic and financial crisis affected countries (other than the United States) through 
four transmission channels: the wealth channel, the investment channel, the trade channel 
and the transfer channel. At the macroeconomic level, the trade and investment channels 
were most responsible for severe output losses. The crisis was transmitted in sequences: to 
begin with, the subprime crisis led to the worldwide depreciation of financial assets. De-
spite the fact, that many countries suffered significant reductions in asset holdings, the 
wealth channel does not seem to have caused major long-term damage to economic 
growth. But then, the collapse of Lehman Brothers brought about the abrupt end to inter-
bank lending, a dramatic increase in the cost of finance and the sudden interruption of 
global investment flows. The investment channel had serious repercussions on economic 
performance and growth prospects planet-wide. The ensuing financial collapse triggered a 
deep recession in the US and Europe and to a drastic decline in global aggregate demand 
and world trade volumes. The trade channel seriously affected exporting countries all over 
the world, directly affecting economic output and leading to income contractions. Finally, 
the recession in high-income countries caused remittances to developing countries to de-
crease. Because only a few developing countries are highly dependent on remittances, 
cross-country evidence suggests that the transfer channel was not very relevant. Yet re-
duced transfers severely affect welfare in economies that are dependent on remittances. 
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This paper makes the case that countercyclical policies were crucial in determining the 
extent to which the crisis affected individual countries. In contrast to previous economic 
crises, many governments embarked on countercyclical policies as soon as the global eco-
nomic and financial crisis erupted. Our empirical analysis suggests that this most recent 
economic and financial crisis was less severe than expected and that most countries recov-
ered relatively quickly because their fiscal positions had improved before the crisis – 
meaning that extensive countercyclical fiscal and monetary policies were affordable.  
The crisis nevertheless affected many countries – developed and developing. We have ana-
lysed El Salvador, Tajikistan and Cambodia in order to assess the microeconomic effects of 
the crisis in those developing countries that experienced income contractions or growth revi-
sions in 2009. Evidence from these countries suggests that the crisis primarily affected house-
holds through the labour market and through decreased inflows of remittances.  
Job losses and wage reductions were observed in all three countries. Job losses in the formal 
sector appear to have increased pressure on the informal sector, causing incomes to drop and 
conditions in the labour market to worsen. In El Salvador, Tajikistan and Cambodia, entrepre-
neurs suffered the greatest income contractions. Informal entrepreneurs were also affected, but 
to different degrees in each country. In terms of socio-demographic background, households 
with lower educational backgrounds were more severely affected than more highly educated 
households, at least in Tajikistan and El Salvador. The impact of the labour market on the 
poorest households varied considerably between the countries. In countries where the poor 
mainly live off agricultural production, the poorest deciles fared relatively well. But in El Sal-
vador, where income from labour contributes as much as 50% to household income in the 
lowest income decile, the poor suffered a lot.  
In economies that are dependent on remittances, the transfer channel plays a large role at 
the micro-level. Households with migrating household members evidenced income reduc-
tions in all three countries despite variations in their share of the population, as well as in 
the amount of the drop in remittances. The reductions were greatest in El Salvador and 
Tajikistan and least in Cambodia.  
During the crisis, changes in social spending significantly affected household incomes in 
Tajikistan and El Salvador, but not in Cambodia. The poorest deciles in Tajikistan faced 
reductions in income from social assistance despite government attempts to shield the 
most vulnerable groups. In El Salvador, in contrast, the poorest households most benefited 
from increased social spending. In Cambodia, social spending remained negligible during 
the crisis. 
This paper concludes that scaling up existing cash transfer schemes might be the most feasi-
ble option for most low and middle income countries in order to protect their populations 
from the adverse consequences of economic shocks. In times of crisis, cash transfer pro-
grammes –including public works – can be extended to increase benefits per capita or to 
reach more of those vulnerable to the effects of a crisis. However, if there are no pre-
existing transfer schemes, it is difficult to target additional social spending to those most in 
need. Building up cash transfer schemes ad-hoc is more difficult than expanding existing 
ones. Nonetheless, some countries have been successful in building new transfer schemes 
during crises. In such cases, a careful assessment about the kinds of programmes that are 
feasible in light of each country’s financial and institutional capacities is indispensable. 
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1 Introduction 
The global economic and financial crisis of 2008–2009 erupted while many developing 
countries were still suffering from the effects of the fuel and food price crisis of 2007, 
causing fears that the latest crisis would exacerbate the effects of earlier crisis and lead to 
considerable increases in poverty and greater rates of unemployment rates worldwide. The 
relatively modest impact that the economic and financial crisis had on the economic per-
formance of many developing countries gave lie to this fear and with early signs of recov-
ery, many observers concluded that the economic and financial crisis was felt less strongly 
there than in the developed world. Today, however, three years after the crisis peaked, we 
still do not know much about the microeconomic effects of the global economic and fi-
nancial crisis on developing countries. 
Early assessments of the effects of the global economic and financial crisis on developing 
countries were mostly published by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World 
Bank – soon after the crisis had peaked. Several studies suggested that the impact of the crisis 
on developing countries was less harsh than expected (IMF 2009; World Bank 2009; World 
Bank / IMF 2010). Additional insights into the macroeconomic effects of the crisis were pro-
vided, among others, by Rose and Spiegel (2009), Berg et al. (2010) and Berkmen et al. 
(2012), who analysed the factors that determine the degree to which various countries were 
affected. Both strands of literature help us understand the transmission channels of the crisis. 
They also indicate the specificities of this particular crisis in comparison with previous crises. 
But although these studies provide highly relevant insights into the macroeconomic effects of 
the crisis on developing countries, its micro-level effects remain unclear. The lack of adequate 
and timely available data for microeconomic impact assessments inspired some authors to 
conduct simulation studies (e.g. Ravallion 2009; Friedman / Shady 2009), while others ex-
perimented with rapid qualitative assessments. Conducted by the Institute of Development 
Studies (IDS), Asian Development Bank (ADB), International Labour Organization (ILO), 
World Bank (WB), United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and World Food Pro-
gramme (WFP), such assessments aimed at providing timely evidence about the impact of the 
crisis on firms and households in selected countries and sectors (i.a. WFP 2009; Bauer / Thant 
2010; Heltberg / Hossain / Reva 2012). In contrast to the macro-literature, many of these stud-
ies found significant effects of the crisis in developing countries, providing evidence that 
members of more vulnerable groups, such as workers with lower educational backgrounds, 
informal-sector employees and own-account workers suffered the most during the crisis. 
However, the representativeness of these findings is weak, since only some countries and sec-
tors were included and because many of the survey sites and sectors were specifically selected 
because of their vulnerability to the effects of the crisis. It is therefore not possible to derive 
generalisable results from these findings. Quantitative and nationally representative studies 
have been provided in only a few cases (McCulloch / Grover 2010; Kroeger / Meier 2012). 
This paper furnishes new evidence about the short-term microeconomic effects of the global 
economic and financial crisis. It is divided into two main parts. The first part – Chapter 2 – 
reassesses the evidence regarding transmission channels and the immediate macroeconomic 
effects of the global crisis. It also provides quantitative evidence about each channel’s rele-
vance in transmitting the crisis – worldwide, and to developing countries in particular. This 
part is necessary in order to understand the mechanisms through which countries were af-
fected by the crisis and their effects on the populations of developing countries. The second 
main part of this paper – Chapter 3 – analyses the short-term effects of the crisis on house-
Esther Gehrke 
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holds in El Salvador, Tajikistan and Cambodia. It provides nationally representative evi-
dence from three developing countries that were affected by the crisis, although to different 
degrees and through different channels. The paper thus shows which population groups 
were most affected by the recent crisis and the effectiveness of national response strategies 
in protecting households from the global crisis. Chapter 4 concludes with tentative thoughts 
about how social protection schemes could be designed to cushion some microeconomic 
effects of economic crises in developing countries. 
2 Short-term effects of the economic and financial crisis on developing 
countries 
The global economic and financial crisis led to gross domestic product (GDP) contractions 
in most of the world. In 2009, at the peak of the crisis, GDP per capita growth became 
negative in every region except for South Asia (as shown in Figure 1). The global eco-
nomic and financial crisis most severely impacted Europe and Central Asia, North Amer-
ica, Latin America and Caribbean, and East Asia and Pacific. 
High income countries were the first to suffer the consequences of the breakdown of 
the financial markets in the United States. They also faced the deepest overall impact, 
with average GDP per capita growth rates around -4.5% in 2009 (Figure 2). But al-
though the growth rate of GDP per capita remained positive for the group of low and 
middle income countries as a whole, it did slow down markedly and turned negative 
for some of them. The effect of the crisis on developing countries is particularly im-
portant because even small corrections to the growth prospects of developing countries 
can threaten progress in poverty reduction and make it more difficult to reach the Mil-
lennium Development Goals. 
The rest of this chapter provides more detailed evidence about how the economic and fi-
nancial crisis was transmitted from its epicentre to the rest of the world, and the relevance 
of these effects to developing countries. Section 2.1 explains the channels that were re-
sponsible for transmitting the crisis worldwide, and to developing countries in particular. 
Section 2.2 describes different policy responses that served to partly offset the effects of 
the crisis and Section 2.3 quantitatively assesses the factors that determine the short-term 
macroeconomic effects of the global crisis. 
2.1 Transmission channels of the global economic and financial crisis 
Although the subprime crisis started in the United States, its repercussions were felt world-
wide. The collapse of Lehman Brothers in autumn 2008 transformed the financial crisis into a 
global economic crisis, which was transmitted to the rest of the world through four main 
channels: the wealth channel, the investment channel, the trade channel and the transfer chan-
nel. The trade and the investment channels were most responsible for high output losses at the 
macroeconomic level. The transfer channel also played an important role in the global trans-
mission of the crisis, but because only a few countries are highly dependent on inflows of re-
mittances, its effect is more visible at the micro- than the macro-level.  
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The crisis was transmitted in sequences. First, the subprime crisis led to the worldwide 
depreciation of financial assets, what is referred to as the wealth channel. The collapse of 
Lehman Brothers was followed by an interruption in global interbank lending and the abrupt 
end to investment flows: the investment channel. The financial collapse led to deep reces-
sions in the US and Europe, and to drastic declines in global aggregate demand and trade 
volumes. This trade channel affected exporting countries all over the world. Finally, the 
transfer channel refers to the drop in public and private transfers to developing countries 
caused by decreasing public revenues and rising unemployment in high income countries. 
Sections 2.1.1 to 2.1.4 show how each of these four channels helped transmit the crisis to 
developing countries. 
Figure 1: GDP per capita growth by region 
Source: World Bank (2012) 
Figure 2:  GDP per capita growth by country per-capita income level 
Source: World Bank (2012) 
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2.1.1 The wealth channel 
Although the wealth channel caused the worldwide depreciation and destruction of finan-
cial assets that were highly exposed to US assets backed by sub-prime mortgages, it did 
not contribute significantly to the transmission of the economic and financial crisis (Lane / 
Milesi-Ferretti 2010). In contrast to expectations at the start of the financial crisis, in most 
developing countries only some assets were destroyed.  
A country’s economic structure determines the degree to which the destruction of assets 
might result in lower rates of growth. This is especially true if investments are financed 
from assets holdings and if the destruction of assets is accompanied by lower rates of sub-
sequent investment. The severity of this effect depends on the initial endowment of finan-
cial assets, which means that it should be most felt in rich countries. High income coun-
tries have the highest average share of net foreign assets in GDP; in low- and middle-
income countries the share is rather modest (Figure 3). The highest shares of foreign assets 
in GDP can be found in the Europe and Central Asia (ECA), East Asia and Pacific (EAP) 
and Middle East and North Africa (MENA) regions (Figure 4).  
To assess the relevance of this channel, we compared the share of net foreign assets in 
GDP over time and across regions and country groups1 and found no significant reduc-
tion in the share of net foreign assets in GDP from 2007 to 2009. While this share 
dropped slightly from 2007 to 2008 in most regions, and – except for high income 
OECD countries – for all income levels as well, in 2009 it recovered and in many 
cases, surpassed 2007 levels.  
The decrease in net foreign assets did not seem dependent on the initial endowment: some 
regions and groups of countries saw almost no change in their percentage of net foreign 
assets of GDP while others experienced change independent of the initial level. The de-
preciation of foreign assets seems to have been greatest for reporting economies in the 
Middle East and North Africa, and in East Asia and Pacific, as well as for high income 
non-OECD countries – but these were not the regions and country groups that suffered the 
deepest growth contractions during the financial crisis. 
In contrast to our expectations, 2009 brought a remarkable increase in the percentage of 
net foreign assets in GDP in certain regions and in high income countries. This could be 
explained by the fact that if the absolute values remain constant, a decrease in GDP auto-
matically increases the share of net foreign assets in GDP. This is plausible given the con-
tractions in GDP in Latin America and Caribbean (LAC), EAP, ECA and North America 
(NA), but it does not appear to be the only explanation. It seems as if markets were able to 
recover relatively quickly from the destruction of assets. For example, countries in the 
MENA region were able to accumulate foreign assets even in 2008 and 2009 because of 
the persistently high fuel prices. 
2.1.2 The investment channel 
The investment channel significantly contributed to the international transmission of the 
financial crisis, causing deep impacts on developing and developed economies. As a  
consequence of the Lehman Brothers’ crash in 2008, interbank lending collapsed entirely, 
                                                            
1 We used the share of net foreign assets in GDP as an indicator for the destruction of financial assets 
because it was the only indicator available at the aggregate level. In addition, most financial assets 
were depreciated in the US; for all other countries, the effect would have been most evident on foreign, 
as opposed to total, assets. This measure is imprecise because it changes with fluctuations of the GDP. 
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Figure 3:  Net foreign assets (% of GDP) by country per-capita income level 
Source: World Bank (2012) 
 
Figure 4:  Net foreign assets (% of GDP) by region 
Source: World Bank (2012) 
leading to the worldwide interruption of investment flows. Countries with high foreign 
investment inflows prior to the onset of the crisis were especially susceptible.  
An interruption of financial flows seriously affects economic growth because capital be-
comes more expensive. Higher borrowing costs and tighter credit rationing usually lead to 
lower investment rates and lower future economic growth. Drastic changes – such as those 
observed during the global economic and financial crisis – immediately affect output lev-
els because the transition from high to low capital-output ratios leads to discontinuities in 
the production process and to output losses. 
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The sharp drop in financial flows in 2007 and 2008 affected almost all developing regions. 
Only the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) suffered net outflows of private fi-
nance (Figure 5). Other regions that experienced pronounced contractions were Develop-
ing Asia and Central and Eastern Europe. Although there were huge variations, contrac-
tions for the whole group of developing and emerging economies were modest compared 
to those in high income countries, where in 2009, net private financial inflows fell on av-
erage by 90.6% (World Bank 2012). Between 2008 and 2009, net inflows to all high in-
come countries fell by a total of US$ 630 billion. A clear overlap is observed of the re-
gions and country groups affected by the financial effects and those that suffered income 
contractions at the peak of the crisis. 
Not only the share of foreign liabilities in GDP, also the composition of financial flows 
and their stability determined whether or not this channel affected a particular country. 
The huge differences between high, middle and low income countries can be explained 
partly by poorer countries’ limited integration in international financial markets2, and also 
by the higher share of more stable Foreign direct investment (FDI) in total liabilities in 
middle income, as compared with high income countries3. As shown in Figure 5, the fi-
nancial crisis was preceded by a period of above-average growth of international invest-
ment flows, which may have been of questionable sustainability even before the crisis. 
The composition of pre-crisis investment flows is likely to have influenced the severity of 
the contraction of post-crisis inflows (after 2008). 
                                                            
2  The average foreign liabilities share of GDP is 88.3%, 72.2% and 82.7% for low income, lower middle 
income and upper middle income countries respectively, and 287.1% for high income countries (IMF 
2010a). 
3  The average share of FDI in total investment stocks is 42.6% in upper middle income countries and 
44.8% in lower middle income countries. In high income countries the share is 20.5% (IMF 2010a). 
Figure 5:  Net private financial flows by region (in US$ billions) 
Notes:  Net private financial flows comprise net private direct investments, net private portfolio flows 
and net other private financial flows. Data are available for developing regions only. 
Source:  IMF (2011)  
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2.1.3 The trade channel 
The interruptions in trade flows were felt in every region and significantly contributed to 
the international transmission of the economic and financial crisis. Trade flows slowed in 
late 2008 and collapsed completely in 2009 (Ocampo et al. 2010), that is, the trade chan-
nel became significant after the wealth and investment channels.  
In Western Europe and the US, recessions led to a sharp decline in the demand for goods 
and services from all over the world. Export markets in developed and developing coun-
tries were affected, with major repercussions on aggregate production and employment in 
the affected economies.  
Import and export growth was negative in 2009 for every region of the world (Figure 6), 
with the value of exports decreasing by more than 10 per cent except in South Asia. Ex-
port contractions were most pronounced in Europe and Central Asia, and in East Asia and 
Pacific, followed by Latin America and Caribbean, and North America. These four re-
gions were also the regions with the sharpest growth contractions in 2009. 
Figure 6:  Export and import growth in 2009 by region 
Notes:  Regional data for MENA and sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) are not available.  
Source:  World Bank (2012) 
2.1.4 The transfer channel 
With a few exceptions, international transfers in the form of official aid and private remit-
tances remained more or less stable during the financial crisis. This suggests that the trans-
fer channel contributed less than expected to the international transmission of the crisis 
(e.g. Ocampo et al. 2010). Nonetheless, it is likely that those regions and countries with 
reduced transfer inflows also experienced lower income growth.  
Since the recessions were deepest in high income countries, countries that depend on 
them for regular flows of remittances or development assistance should have been af-
fected (Brach / Loewe 2009). While public transfers mainly affect GDP through gov-
ernment spending, reduced private transfers affect household income and consumption. 
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Both government spending and household consumption directly contribute to GDP, 
meaning that reductions in international transfers almost always affect economic 
growth.  
Official aid flows remained stable during the crisis, with the Middle East and North Africa 
the only region that experienced negative growth in Official Development Assistance 
(ODA) (World Bank 2012). In all other regions, ODA grew throughout the crisis, so it is 
unlikely that reduced aid flows played a role in transmitting the crisis to developing and 
emerging economies. 
During the crisis, remittances inflows grew steadily in East Asia and Pacific as well as in 
South Asia, and remained more or less constant in sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle East 
and North Africa. Inflows of remittances decreased in only two regions – Europe and Cen-
tral Asia, and Latin America and Caribbean (Figure 7). However, the fact that in 2009 
these two regions posted significant output losses suggests that the drop in remittances 
inflows may have played a role in the economic performance of some countries and re-
gions. In the ECA region, which experienced the strongest decline, remittances fell by as 
much as 10.8% in 2009 (World Bank 2012).  
Figure 7:  Remittances inflows by region (in current US$ billions) 
Source:  World Bank (2012) 
2.2 Policy response 
Some countries were able to withstand the transmission effects of the crisis because 
their governments were willing and able to react in good time. This crisis appears to 
have been less severe than expected, with most countries recovering from it relatively 
quickly due to the improved fiscal positions of many countries prior to the crisis and 
thanks to extensive countercyclical policies that were initiated as soon as the crisis 
erupted (Ocampo et al. 2010; World Bank 2010a). Policy response variously influ-
ences the incidence and severity of a crisis. 
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First, a country’s exchange rate regime can influence the severity with which an external 
shock is transmitted to the domestic market. Berkmen et al. (2012) suggest that countries 
with flexible exchange rates are better equipped to handle external shocks, a finding that 
was supported by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2010).  
Second, increased government spending can stimulate internal demand, thereby offsetting 
the negative effects of trade contractions. In all regions, government spending increased 
during the crisis (IMF 2011) and in many countries and regions sound economic and fiscal 
policies were able to dampen its adverse effects (IMF 2010b). However, the timing and 
scale of government spending growth varied between regions. Governments in Latin 
America and Caribbean and in Developing Asia began to increase spending in 2007, 
whereas governments in the Commonwealth of Independent States and the Middle East 
and North Africa sharply increased spending only in 2009.  
Third, initial debt can serve as an indicator for a government’s ability to react to a crisis. 
In the years prior to the global financial and economic crisis of 2008, many developing 
countries had managed to improve their fiscal position and reduce external debt, leading to 
expectations that these countries would suffer less during the financial crisis. Initial debt 
levels can also serve as indicators for the sustainability of countercyclical policies.  
Data regarding government manœuverability is not available at the aggregate level; the 
significance of these factors is assessed in the next section.  
2.3 Determinants of the short-term macroeconomic effects 
This section assesses whether the huge cross-country variation in macroeconomic per-
formance observed in 2009 can be explained by the exposure of individual countries to the 
transmission channels of the global economic and financial crisis. This is tested in a cross-
country regression analysis, which shows that three main factors determine the depth to 
which an economy was affected by the global crisis: the country’s trade structure; its fi-
nancial structure; and its willingness and ability to react to the crisis. This indicates the 
significance of a country’s vulnerability to the two most relevant transmission channels of 
the global crisis –the investment and the trade channels. However, it also shows that, at 
least in the short-term, prudent countercyclical fiscal and economic policies were crucial 
for cushioning the effects of the crisis in developed and developing countries.  
Section 2.3.1 describes the empirical approach in more detail; the regression results for all 
countries – and specifically for low and lower middle income countries – are discussed in 
sections 2.3.2 and 2.3.3. 
2.3.1 Methodological approach 
In our empirical analysis, we tested the country characteristics that can be used to predict 
how strongly an economy was affected by the global economic and financial crisis. We 
used the difference in GDP per capita growth rates4 – the difference between the growth 
                                                            
4  This value is obtained by subtracting the average growth rate between 1997 and 2007 from the actual 
growth rate in 2009. This indicator seems to best represent the crisis-induced disruption of general 
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rate in 2009 and the average of growth rates in the years before the crisis – as a proxy for 
the severity of the short-term effects of the global crisis. In contrast to existing literature, 
we took into account not only the variables that can predict a country’s vulnerability to the 
four transmission channels of the crisis, but also the variables that represent a country’s 
resilience to the crisis.  
Potential explanatory variables were grouped into five categories: proxies for a country’s 
vulnerability to each of the four transmission channels, plus variables that proxy a coun-
try’s resilience. In each category, the two or three variables with the highest explanatory 
power (the strongest bivariate correlation) were retained.5 The estimation strategy was an 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) model. We conducted cross-sectional regressions with dif-
ferent combinations of our explanatory variables in order to identify which variables are 
robust under different specifications. Our dataset contained 94 to 112 countries, depending 
on the specified model. The results are presented and discussed in the following section 
with reference to findings in the literature.  
In Section 2.3.3, the regression was restricted to low income and lower middle income 
countries, in order to test the validity of our results for the subset of poorer countries. This 
step was also necessary for testing if variables that are not significant in the global context 
might have predictive power for poorer countries. 
2.3.2 Regression results for all countries 
The quantitative analysis reveals that much of the observed global variance in the macro-
economic effects of the global economic and financial crisis can be explained by just a 
few variables. First, dependency on financial flows negatively impacted on macroeco-
nomic performance during the financial crisis. The global disruption of international fi-
nancial flows hit countries with a large share of volatile investment inflows especially 
hard. Second, the share of trade in GDP influenced the severity of the crisis impact. Some 
countries were more affected by the crisis than others because of their respective trade 
structures and degrees of economic integration into global value chains, which – espe-
cially if a country was linked to the crisis epicentres – partly accounts for the considerable 
regional differences. Countries dependent on exports to the United States and Western 
Europe were especially affected by the crisis. Third, governmental reactions were of great 
significance. This section suggests a strong positive connection between changes in gov-
ernment spending during the crisis and its effects. The fact that many countries instituted 
countercyclical policies during the crisis can help explain why in many countries, the ef-
fects of the crisis were less severe than expected and the recovery more rapid than pre-
dicted.  
Two models are reported in Table 1. Our preferred model is the first one, but we also re-
port the results of the second model, which serves as a robustness check. In both models, 
regional dummies were included because they increase the model’s predictive power and 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
growth trends. Just looking at the growth rate would not reveal the differences between countries with 
long trends of low growth rates and countries that were performing well before the crisis but which suf-
fered greatly from its impact. Unfortunately, it remains impossible to abstract from other reasons for 
the change in output growth. 
5  See Annex II for a list of variables, and their definitions and sources.  
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Table 1:  Regression results for all countries 
Dep. Var.: Difference in GDP per capita growth rates (2009 – average 1997–2007) 
 (1)    (2)   
Short-term debt (% of total external debt) -0.093 *** (0.04)     
Short-term debt (squared) 0.003 *** (0.00)     
Financing via int’l capital markets (% of GDP) -0.370 ** (0.18)     
Financing via int’l capital markets (squared) 0.018 ** (0.00)     
Private capital flows (% of GDP)     -0.177 ** (0.08)
Private capital flows (squared)     0.005  (0.00)
GDP per capita (constant US$, in 1000)  -0.487 * (0.29)  -0.163 *** (0.05)
Net foreign assets (share of GDP, log normal)     0.872 ** (0.41)
Trade (% of GDP) -0.032 *** (0.01)  -0.033 *** (0.01)
Net exports (% of GDP) 0.047 * (0.03)  -0.024  (0.03)
Exports to US & W. Europe (% of exports) 0.108 *** (0.04)  0.064 * (0.03)
Exports to US & W. Europe (squared) 0.000  (0.00)  0.001  (0.00)
Exports to US & W. Europe (cubic) -0.000 *** (0.00)  -0.000 *** (0.00)
General government gross debt (% of GDP) 0.043 ** (0.02)  0.045 *** (0.01)
General government gross debt (squared) -0.001 *** (0.00)  -0.000 *** (0.00)
Total reserves (% of GDP) 0.030  (0.04)     
Total reserves (squared) 0.003 *** (0.00)     
Dummy government spending increased 2.900 *** (0.94)  2.476 ** (0.96)
Constant -0.365  (1.62)  2.628 ** (1.25)
Regional dummies included 
 
yes    yes   
        
Observations 94    112   
R-Squared 0.73    0.64   
 
Notes:  Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 
Source: Author 
have a positive influence on the normal distribution of the residuals. Furthermore, they only 
affect the size, not the sign, of our estimates and lead to somewhat more conservative predic-
tions. For a comparison of the results with and without regional dummies, see Annex I.  
Wealth levels 
We were not able to determine the relevance of wealth levels for explaining the differ-
ence in GDP per capita growth. We found that GDP per capita levels before the crisis 
were negatively correlated with our measure for crisis impact. But including the 
logged share of net foreign assets to GDP revealed its strong positive relationship to 
our dependent variable. Apparently, the fact that financial assets were destroyed during 
the crisis was irrelevant to subsequent growth rates. It seems plausible to conclude that 
countries with high shares of net foreign assets were less vulnerable to the other ef-
fects of the crisis and so fared better. The strong negative sign of the GDP level coeffi-
cient may result from the fact that the crisis started in the US and Western Europe, where 
it was felt most acutely.  
Esther Gehrke 
14 German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE) 
Financial linkages 
Our findings support the hypothesis that the investment channel accounted for a large 
share of the macroeconomic effects of the crisis. Both the composition of investment 
flows – measured as the share of short-term debt in the total external debt – and the rele-
vance of the economy’s external financing had statistically significant negative coeffi-
cients (Table 1). Two different measures for the importance of external financing were 
tested: first, the share of financing via international capital markets in GDP (the sum of 
gross bond issuance, bank lending and new equity placements) and second, the share of 
private capital flows in GDP (net foreign direct investments and portfolio investments). 
Both were found to be statistically significant with high negative coefficients. This implies 
that countries that were particularly dependent on foreign investment inflows prior to the 
crisis experienced deeper recessions than those that were not. Similar results are reported 
in Berkmen et al. (2012) and in Lane and Milesi-Ferreti (2010).6  
Trade dependency 
Statistical evidence also suggests that the degree to which a country was exposed to the 
trade channel correlates with the difference in 2009 GDP per capita growth. Our analysis 
revealed that trade dependent economies – especially those with the US and Western 
Europe as export partners – were harder hit by the global crisis than other countries. Since 
trade was a major channel for globally transmitting the crisis, it understandably explains 
part of the incidence and severity of the crisis at the macroeconomic level.  
During the crisis, the share of trade in GDP was negatively correlated with economic 
growth, which indicates that more open economies may be more vulnerable. In contrast, 
net exports were positively correlated with the difference in GDP growth. However, this 
effect is only weakly significant and turns negative in the second model.  
Dependency on the US and Western Europe as export partners (measured by the share of ex-
ports to the US and Western Europe in total exports) also seems to have influenced the degree 
to which an economy was affected by the economic and financial crisis. However, the rela-
tionship was not linear, as can be seen in Figure 8, where the lines show the difference be-
tween the linear fit as predicted by OLS and a non-parametric fit. The relationship between 
GDP per capita growth and trade with the US and Western Europe was clearly negative for 
the lower half of the range and turned positive for countries with a greater share of trade with 
the US and Western Europe. To better approximate this relation, we included the squared and 
cubic transformations of this variable in our regression model and found that they, too, are 
statistically significant. The finding that trade direction is correlated with the dependent vari-
able contradicts the results of Rose and Spiegel (2009), who found little evidence that interna-
tional financial or real linkages to the crisis epicentre, namely the United States, influenced the 
macroeconomic impact of the crisis. 7 
                                                            
6  Differences in the coefficients can be attributed to the dependent variable used or the countries studied. 
While Berkmen et al. and Lane and Milesi-Ferretti analysed only developing and emerging economies, 
this paper focuses on all the countries. Furthermore, the dependent variable in the model of Berkmen et 
al. is the amount of growth forecast revisions after the crisis erupted in September 2008.  
7  Rose and Spiegel focused on international linkages that could have been responsible for the global 
spread of the crisis. They used real GDP growth in 2008 combined with changes in stock markets, ex-
change rates and country credit ratings as indicators for the incidence of the crisis. 
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Figure 8:  Scatterplot change in GDP per capita growth – exports to US and Western Europe  
 
Notes:  Lines show the linear fit and the local linear regression line 
Source: Author  
The sectoral composition of trade does not appear to be correlated with the macroeco-
nomic impact of the financial crisis. Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2010) suggest that countries 
that rely on exports of durable and investment goods suffered higher export losses during 
the crisis because these goods are more income elastic. Berkmen et al. (2012) also find 
that countries that export advanced manufactured goods tended to be harder hit by the cri-
sis. This finding is not confirmed by the model applied here: countries with larger shares 
of manufactured goods in exports were not found to have experienced more severe eco-
nomic slowdowns.  
International transfers 
In contrast to the other channels, little evidence has been found that the transfer channel 
was significant at the macro-level in the international transmission of the economic and 
financial crisis. There is no evidence that countries that depend more on private transfers, 
as measured in the share of remittances in 2007 GDP, experienced lower GDP per capita 
growth during the crisis than in previous years. There is also no evidence that the share of 
ODA in income was correlated with the difference in GDP per capita growth during the 
crisis. This finding is unsurprising, since aid flows did not slow during the crisis. But no 
positive correlation was found, either.  
Because the World Bank increased its lending volumes during the crisis, we also tested 
whether recipients were less affected by the crisis than non-recipients. But we discovered 
that lending volumes in 2007 and in 2009, as well as a dummy that took the value one (if 
lending increased from 2007 to 2009), are not correlated with our dependent variable. This 
also held for the subsample of low and lower middle income countries (as reported in Sec-
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tion 2.3.3). However, the effects of increased World Bank lending may have only been felt 
after 2009 and could have helped recipient countries recover from the global economic 
and financial crisis more quickly. This cannot be assessed at this time. 
Government intervention 
We found some evidence that countries that reacted to the global crisis by adopting 
countercyclical policies as soon as the crisis erupted were at least partially able to off-
set its effects.  
Our findings support the hypothesis that countercyclical policies have partly offset the mac-
roeconomic effects of the crisis. As can be seen in Table 1, the change in the government 
spending dummy, which takes the value one if the growth rate of government spending was 
higher in 2009 than in 2007, is positively correlated with the difference in 2009 GDP per 
capita growth. Because doubts have been raised about the sustainability of such policies, it 
would be interesting to see how these countries fared in the years after 2009. 
To test the robustness of our finding that countercyclical policies partly offset the effects of the 
global crisis, we also included variables to represent the ability of governments to react to the 
crisis: the amount of international reserves relative to GDP and the amount of government 
debt relative to GDP. Both variables are positively correlated with the dependent variable, 
which is somewhat surprising since one would expect a negative relationship for government 
debt. However, a closer view reveals that the relationship between government debt and our 
dependent variable resembles a negative quadratic function (Figure 9). While government 
debt and change in GDP per capita growth are positively correlated at lower debt levels, this 
relation turns negative for debt levels that are higher than about 60% of GDP.  
Figure 9:  Scatterplot change in GDP per capita growth – government debt 
 
Notes: Lines show the linear fit and the local linear regression line 
Source:  Author  
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The adjustment of exchange rates, in contrast, seems not to have influenced the impact of 
the economic and financial crisis. No evidence was found that the de jure exchange rate 
regime or the de facto exchange rate adjustment in 2009 (using the US dollar as the point 
of reference) influenced the impact of the crisis. This finding contradicts the literature. For 
example, Berkmen et al. suggested that countries with flexible exchange rates should be 
better able to handle external shocks (2012). Their findings were supported by Lane and 
Milesi-Ferretti (2010) – but not by our econometric estimation.  
2.3.3 Regression results for low and lower middle income countries 
In a second step, we concentrated on the difference between high and upper middle in-
come countries on one hand, and low and lower middle income countries on the other – by 
replicating the regression for the subset of low income and lower middle income coun-
tries. The results are reported in Table 2. 
Interestingly, the results did not change much when only low and lower middle income 
countries were considered. Once again, a country’s financial structure and trade depend-
ency explain much of the crisis impact. The role of policy response seems to be even more 
important in low and lower middle income countries. 
For the poorer set of countries, the share of short-term debt in total external debt is also 
strongly and negatively correlated with the crisis impact. But because our financial inte-
Table 2:  Regression results for Lower middle income country (LMIC) & Low income country (LIC) 
Dep. Var.: Difference in GDP per capita growth rates (2009 – average 1997–2007) 
 (1) (2)   
Short-term debt (% of total external debt) -0.157 *** (0.04) -0.105 ** (0.05) 
Short-term debt (squared) 0.005 *** (0.00) 0.004 *** (0.00) 
GDP per capita (constant US$, in 1000)  -2.196 *** (0.61) -1.931 ** (0.86) 
Trade (% of GDP) -0.029 ** (0.01) -0.019  (0.02) 
Net exports (% of GDP) 0.068 ** (0.03) 0.020  (0.04) 
Exports to US & W. Europe (% of exports) 0.077 * (0.05) 0.054  (0.04) 
Exports to US & W. Europe (squared) -0.001  (0.00) -0.001  (0.00) 
Exports to US & W. Europe (cubic) -0.000 *** (0.00) -0.000 *** (0.00) 
General government gross debt (% of GDP) 0.067 *** (0.02) 0.046 ** (0.02) 
General government gross debt (squared) -0.001 ** (0.00) -0.001 ** (0.00) 
Total reserves (% of GDP) 0.050  (0.05) 0.051  (0.05) 
Total reserves (squared) 0.006 * (0.00) 0.007 * (0.00) 
Dummy government spending increased 4.227 *** (1.52) 4.013 *** (1.09) 
Constant -0.592  (1.95) -8.101 ** (3.99) 
Regional dummies included no  yes   
      
Observations 53  53   
R-Squared 0.71  0.79   
 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 
Source: Author 
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gration measures were both not statistically significant, they were dropped. Perhaps this is 
because there is less variance in these variables for poorer countries.  
Trade openness is still negatively correlated with the dependent variable, although only as 
long as regional dummies are not included. Interestingly, a non-linear relationship remains 
between the share in exports to the US and Western Europe and the difference in 2009 
GDP per capita growth relative to the pre-crisis years.  
For poorer countries, government intervention seems to be more important than for richer 
countries. The coefficients of the government spending dummy, as well as those of the 
government debt and public reserves variables, continue to be statistically significant and 
become even larger when only low and lower middle income countries are considered. 
In the second model, we also included variables that do not influence the total set of coun-
tries but might be more relevant for developing countries – such as dependency on remit-
tances, aid flows and World Bank loans. These variables are not statistically significant. 
We also tested the relevance of export structure for the smaller subset of countries, but did 
not find any statistical relationship. Therefore, it seems valid to conclude that similar char-
acteristics determined the severity of the global crisis in the economies of developing and 
developed countries. 
3 Short-term effects of the economic and financial crisis on households in 
El Salvador, Tajikistan and Cambodia 
In Tajikistan, El Salvador and Cambodia, the crisis affected households mainly through 
reduced labour income and reduced inflows of remittances, with different effects on for-
mal and informal employment. Job losses in the formal sector put additional pressure on 
the informal sector, and increased informal employment caused general deteriorations in 
employment conditions and wage reductions in the labour market (UN-DESA 2011; Velde 
et al. 2009). Disproportional income contractions for entrepreneurs were observed in all 
three countries. Informal entrepreneurs were also affected, but to different extents in each 
country. In terms of social characteristics, households with less education were more se-
verely affected by the crisis than households with higher education, especially in terms of 
labour market income. Concurring with existing evidence, we conclude that households of 
all groups suffered income losses because of the crisis, but that less educated and more 
vulnerable households seemed to be less able to find alternative employment opportuni-
ties.  
We also show that there is considerable variation in how labour market effects impact the 
poor. In countries where the poor mainly live from agricultural production, the poorest 
deciles fared relatively well, whereas in El Salvador, where labour income contributes as 
much as 50% to household income in the lowest income decile, the crisis caused real suf-
fering among the poor. 
The transfer channel seems to have played a very important role at the micro-level. 
Households with migrating household members were faced with income reductions in all 
countries, despite variations in their share of the overall population and the extent to which 
remittances dropped off. The effect was most pronounced in El Salvador and Tajikistan 
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and least pronounced in Cambodia. In contrast, reduced social spending noticeably af-
fected the poorer populations of Tajikistan, while social spending remained negligible in 
Cambodia and increased in El Salvador. The poorest households in El Salvador benefited 
from increased social spending.  
These findings are elaborated in the following sections: Section 3.1 describes the meth-
odological approach and Sections 3.2, 3.3 and 3.4 discuss the effects of the global eco-
nomic and financial crisis on households in El Salvador, Tajikistan and Cambodia, respec-
tively. The country sections all follow the same order: first, evidence is provided about the 
respective transmission channels and each country’s reaction to the crisis. Then microeco-
nomic effects are assessed through analysing changes in income by income levels and 
socio-demographic characteristics. Finally, income changes for the subsample of the poor-
est 30% of the population are analysed in greater detail. 
3.1 Methodological approach 
The micro-level impact of the global economic and financial crisis was assessed by com-
paring data from three developing countries that were affected by the crisis, but to differ-
ent degrees and through different channels (Figure 10). El Salvador, Tajikistan and Cam-
bodia were selected using the following considerations: only low and middle income 
countries with poverty rates above 2% were considered;8 and just export-dependent coun-
tries (where exports account for more than 20% of GDP) were eligible, because we con-
sider the trade channel to have been one of the main transmission channels of the crisis. 
Only countries with growth corrections (April 2008 projections compared to October 2010 
data, IMF 2011), negative GDP or export growth came into question, as well as countries 
where household surveys had been conducted in 2007 and 2009 – thus permitting analysis 
                                                            
8  Poverty rates are measured as poverty headcount ratio at US$ 1.25 a day (PPP). 
Figure 10:  Annual real GDP per capita growth (in %) 
Source: World Bank (2012) 
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of the impact of the crisis on different population groups shortly before and after the eco-
nomic and financial crisis. The following surveys were used: the Encuesta de Hogares de 
Propósitos Múltiples (EHPM), conducted by the Dirección General de Estadística y Cen-
sos in El Salvador; the Living Standards Measurement Survey (LSMS)9 in Tajikistan con-
ducted by the World Bank in collaboration with the State Committee on Statistics of Taji-
kistan; and the Cambodia Socio-Economic Survey (CSES) conducted by the National In-
stitute of Statistics of Cambodia. 
The analysis of the micro-level effects was based on the comparison of average incomes 
in various population groups before and after the crisis. Sample averages for different 
groups were calculated from nationally representative household surveys, taking into ac-
count stratification and clustering, and using the sample weights provided by the statistical 
organisations responsible for the survey design and data collection. Groups were created 
by classifying households according to criteria that can be compared before and after the 
crisis, as well as between countries. The criteria were selected to be as constant as possi-
ble, at least in the short term, for example household structure and the head of household’s 
sex and age group, as well as social characteristics, such as the educational background 
and employment status of the household’s primary breadwinner. The household’s access 
to transfers is also considered. Some of these variables are clearly endogenous to struc-
tural changes such as an economic crisis, but wherever this is so, we tried to account for 
potential changes by also taking changes of group sizes into consideration. 
Average income was calculated as monthly per capita income and converted into constant 
international dollars to ensure comparability between countries and over time. The de-
pendent variable was calculated so that it can be compared despite differences in the three 
countries’ economic structures and survey designs. Monthly income per capita was calcu-
lated by adding up household income from all sources then dividing that sum by the num-
ber of household members. To ensure inter-temporal and cross-national comparability, 
income was converted to the constant 2005 international dollar in purchasing power pari-
ties (PPP).  
Our methodological approach suffers from inaccurate price data. Converting income from 
current local currency units (LCU) to constant 2005 international dollar (PPP) is the best 
way to make data comparable not just before and after the crisis, but also between coun-
tries. However, the 2007 food crisis caused an unprecedented rise in food prices that 
probably has not been completely captured by the available price data. The lack of good 
data complicates our research, making it more useful to consider differences between 
groups rather than study absolute changes. Assuming that income increased for all groups, 
which groups saw smaller increases, and which saw more? The data at hand allows us to 
answer such questions.  
                                                            
9  Although the Tajik dataset is a panel dataset, in order to ensure comparability with the other two da-
tasets it was treated as repeated cross-sections. Employing the panel structure of the dataset, Kroeger 
and Meier (2012) find similar results. This suggests that our approach does not exclude any important 
insights and reduces the risk of measurement error biasing estimates. 
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3.2 El Salvador 
El Salvador is a lower middle income country with poverty rates10 of 13.4% in 2007 
(World Bank 2012). The country’s regional proximity to the United States and its depend-
ency on the US as a trade partner and host country for most of its migrants made El Salva-
dor vulnerable to the effects of the global economic and financial crisis, especially through 
contractions in trade and inflows of remittances. Indeed, El Salvador was the Central 
American country most affected by the crisis. Micro-level repercussions seriously affected 
poorer households. The macro- and microeconomic effects of the crisis in El Salvador are 
derived in Sections 3.2.1 and 3.2.2. 
3.2.1 Macroeconomic effects and policy responses 
Among the countries we consider here, El Salvador was the one most affected by the 
global economic and financial crisis. In 2008 GDP per capita growth decelerated and in 
2009 it turned negative (annual average -3.6%). The difference in GDP per capita growth 
rates (the difference between the growth rate in 2009 and the average of growth rates from 
1997 to 2007) reveals that the effect of the crisis was pronounced: -6.1 percentage points.  
The crisis was mainly transmitted to El Salvador through the trade and transfer channels. 
Foreign assets did not play a major role in the economy: net foreign assets were only 
about 11.0% of GDP in 2007. During the crisis, the real value of these assets shrank 
slightly – by about 7.4% (2008). In 2007, investment flows contributed just 6.4% to GDP, 
which suggests that the 25.9% drop in inflows in 2008 did not harshly affect the economy. 
However, the exports share of GDP was 25.9% in 2007 so the 16.0% drop in exports in 
                                                            
10  Poverty rates are measured as poverty headcount ratio at US$ 2 a day (PPP). 
Figure 11: General government revenue and expenditure in El Salvador 
 
Notes: Values in constant 2009 US$, in millions  
Source:  IMF (2011) 
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2009 were surely felt at the micro-level. The transfer channel also helped transmit the cri-
sis to El Salvador. Although in 2007, Official Development Assistance was insignificant 
to the economy (0.5% of GDP), that year remittances inflows contributed 18.5% to GDP 
and in 2009 many Salvadorans surely felt their drop by 9.4%.  
The Government of El Salvador reacted to the crisis by increasing government spending 
(Figure 11). Because government revenue fell in the same period, the cash deficit rose 
from 1.3% of GDP in 2007 to 5.6% of GDP in 2009 (IMF 2011).  
The Salvadoran policy response followed two main strategies: cushioning the short-term 
impacts on the most vulnerable populations through increased social protection and em-
ployment generation, and ensuring medium-term fiscal sustainability by strengthening 
public finance (World Bank 2010b).  
3.2.2 Microeconomic effects 
In El Salvador, all income deciles and social groups suffered severe income losses during 
the economic and financial crisis, with poorer households generally more deeply affected 
than richer households. In particular, income from labour fell dramatically for households 
at the lower end of income distribution, although this loss was partly offset by increasing 
agricultural production and social assistance income. The drop in remittances inflows con-
tributed to overall income contraction and affected all income deciles – but mainly those 
households with migrating household members.11 
The strong effect of the reduction in labour income could be understood as poorer house-
holds more often having unstable job situations because of their lower human capital or 
because they run small-scale businesses and thus are more vulnerable to the effects of the 
crisis. Indeed, households with less education and in less stable employment situations 
were, on average, more affected by the crisis. However, we also found that the employers 
group suffered an above-average reduction in monthly income, while the income of in-
formal entrepreneurs seems to have remained more or less constant. These findings are 
elaborated in greater detail below.  
Changes in income by deciles 
Average monthly per capita income decreased from 2007 to 2009 for all income deciles. 
As shown in Table 3, the most pronounced contraction was felt by the three lowest income 
deciles. For the poorest group, the first income decile, monthly per capita income fell by 
as much as 17.6%. The second, third and fourth income deciles also faced above-average 
reductions in income, though they were less extreme than those of the poorest group. The 
tenth decile also faced an above-average decrease in income although this estimate is not 
very reliable, as shown by the size of the standard errors. 
The difference in changes in income shown by income deciles is even more pronounced 
when only labour income, such as income from self-employment or labour market activi-
ties, is considered (Table 4). Here, too, the first income decile faced the  
most pronounced contraction, followed by the second decile. Labour income decreased by 
                                                            
11  See Annex III for variable definitions and small variations in definitions between countries.  
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Table 3: Change in monthly per capita income by income deciles in El Salvador 
Income deciles 
2007 2009 Percentage 
change T-test Mean std. error Mean std. error 
1 48.71 0.41 40.15 0.34 -17.58% *** 
2 83.36 0.26 75.08 0.23 -9.93% *** 
3 109.82 0.25 102.42 0.22 -6.74% *** 
4 137.22 0.28 129.89 0.24 -5.35% *** 
5 169.71 0.32 162.27 0.28 -4.38% *** 
6 204.82 0.42 196.45 0.34 -4.08% *** 
7 251.32 0.53 241.62 0.50 -3.86% *** 
8 315.59 0.78 306.73 0.83 -2.81% *** 
9 427.50 1.79 419.74 1.61 -1.82% *** 
10 1027.54 54.64 969.71 32.73 -5.63% *** 
Total  277.01 9.38 263.99 7.46 -4.70% * 
 
Notes: Values in constant 2005 international $ (PPP) 
 *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05 
Source:  DIGESTYC (2008 / 2010) 
 
Table 4: Change in monthly per capita income from labour by income decile in El Salvador 
Income deciles 
2007 2009 Percentage 
change T-test mean std. error mean std. error 
1 24.27 0.88 15.94 0.60 -34.31% *** 
2 48.84 1.21 43.86 0.95 -10.20% *** 
3 75.42 1.48 70.06 1.21 -7.11% *** 
4 98.12 1.76 93.48 1.44 -4.74% ** 
5 120.79 2.24 120.45 1.73 -0.29%  
6 156.78 2.56 154.86 2.04 -1.22%  
7 188.55 3.11 188.59 2.81 0.02%  
8 254.11 3.47 253.98 3.08 -0.05%  
9 351.40 4.70 358.01 4.29 1.88%  
10 901.47 53.66 869.63 35.09 -3.53%  
Total 221.44 8.91 216.48 7.20 -2.24%  
 
Notes: Values in constant 2005 international $ (PPP) 
 *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05 
Source:  DIGESTYC (2008 / 2010) 
34.3% and 10.2% in the first and second deciles, respectively. Statistically significant dif-
ferences in mean income were also found for the third and fourth income deciles, whereas 
changes in labour income for groups at the upper end of the income distribution were not 
statistically significantly different from zero. 
It was possible to partially offset losses in labour income by increasing activity in agricultural 
production, although the changes were only statistically significant for the first income decile. 
In that group, income from agricultural production rose by 29.8% (not reported here).  
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In addition to losses in labour income, households in all income deciles faced reductions 
in income from remittances (Table 5), a change that was statistically significant in all but 
the third and fourth deciles. The other deciles faced contractions between 16.2% and 
27.8%. Because the share of income from remittances to overall income was high for all 
deciles, reduced remittances were one of the major drivers of income loss in El Salvador 
during the crisis. 
Between 2007 and 2009, total income from social assistance increased because of the ex-
pansion of the conditional cash transfer programme during the crisis (Table 6).12 The low-
est income deciles in particular seem to have benefited from the scaling up of social assis-
tance during the crisis, but the targeting seems not to have been very exact. In some dec-
iles, income from social assistance increased, whereas in others, it decreased: the increase 
was not just found at the lower end of the income distribution, nor were contractions in 
income from social assistance confined to the higher income groups. Table 6 shows that 
income from social assistance increased by as much as 171.4% for the fourth decile, 
whereas it decreased by 14.9% for the fifth. This might suggest imprecise targeting, but 
measurement error cannot be excluded as a possible explanation. In 2007, mean income 
from social assistance was very low for the fourth, as compared with the third and fifth, 
deciles.  
Poorer households in El Salvador were differently affected by the global economic and 
financial crisis than richer households. This becomes clear when comparing income struc-
tures for the lowest and the highest income deciles before and after the crisis (Figures 12 
and 13). In the lowest income decile, agricultural production contributed a consider- 
able share to total income. As described above, during the crisis the share of agricultural 
                                                            
12  El Salvador formulated an anti-crisis plan in early 2009 that included expanding the existing condition-
al cash transfer scheme and creating a public works scheme. This plan was supported by the World 
Bank, which increased its lending to El Salvador in 2009 by 41.2% (World Bank 2012).  
Table 5: Change in monthly per capita income from remittances by income decile in El Salvador 
Income deciles 
2007 2009 Percentage 
change T-test mean std. error mean std. error 
1 3.73 0.38 2.69 0.22 -27.78% ** 
2 10.77 0.79 8.35 0.53 -22.42% ** 
3 10.81 0.80 9.94 0.68 -8.07%  
4 16.20 1.08 15.10 0.97 -6.75%  
5 23.67 1.71 18.84 1.20 -20.40% ** 
6 22.61 1.70 18.68 1.32 -17.37% ** 
7 33.15 2.32 24.32 1.75 -26.63% *** 
8 31.66 2.28 24.71 2.02 -21.94% *** 
9 42.45 3.43 35.57 2.81 -16.21% * 
10 63.41 5.45 48.48 8.28 -23.55% ** 
Total 25.84 0.85 20.66 0.99 -20.07% *** 
 
Notes: Values in constant 2005 international $ (PPP) 
 *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05 
Source: DIGESTYC (2008 / 2010) 
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Table 6: Change in monthly per capita income from social assistance by income decile in El 
Salvador 
Income deciles 
2007 2009 Percentage 
change T-test mean std. error mean std. error 
1 2.30 0.31 3.35 0.28 45.82% *** 
2 1.59 0.29 2.54 0.28 59.37% *** 
3 2.00 0.40 2.53 0.42 26.71%  
4 0.72 0.13 1.95 0.29 171.44% *** 
5 1.27 0.56 1.08 0.18 -14.89%  
6 1.02 0.19 1.37 0.29 34.31%  
7 0.97 0.20 1.82 0.95 87.79% ** 
8 1.47 0.30 1.58 0.33 7.50%  
9 1.78 0.30 1.72 0.23 -3.32%  
10 1.66 0.29 2.77 0.45 66.63% *** 
Total 1.48 0.13 2.07 0.15 40.25% *** 
 
Notes: Values in constant 2005 international $ (PPP) 
*** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05 
Source: DIGESTYC (2008 / 2010) 
 
Figure 12: Income composition of the lowest income decile in El Salvador 
Notes: Shares of income from different sources in overall income  
Source: DIGESTYC (2008 / 2010) 
production in total income increased, partly due to increased production and partly from 
the decline in income from other sources, especially labour. Figure 12 also shows that 
the share of social assistance in overall income increased from 4.7% in 2007 to 8.4% 
in 2009 while the share of private transfers in overall income increased from 9.5% to 
13.6%. In absolute terms, income from private transfers and social assistance increased 
from US$ 4.7 to US$ 5.4 and from US$ 2.3 to US$ 3.4 respectively.  
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Figure 13:  Income composition of the highest income decile in El Salvador 
Notes: Shares of income from different sources in overall income 
Source: DIGESTYC (2008 / 2010) 
In the highest income decile, the share of labour income in total income actually increased 
during the crisis. However, this should not be interpreted as an absolute increase in labour 
income for this group, but rather in conjunction with the sharper decline in income from 
all other sources. For example, the share of remittances in overall income shrank from 
6.2% to 5.0% between 2007 and 2009, which in real terms is associated with a decrease in 
monthly per capita income from US$ 63.4 to US$ 48.5. 
Changes in income by socio-demographic characteristics 
In El Salvador, socio-demographic characteristics seem to have driven some of the micro-
economic effects of the crisis. Table 7 gives an overview of the changes in monthly per 
capita income by socio-demographic characteristics. 
Households headed by working-age women were, on average, more deeply affected by the 
economic and financial crisis than others. The change in income for male-headed households 
was much smaller than for female-headed households. Also, households whose heads were of 
pension age appear to have suffered no income losses during the crisis, while households with 
younger heads suffered contractions of about 5%. This could be because pensions remained 
constant during the crisis, whereas labour income generally decreased. 
Households whose main income provider had no basic education experienced stronger 
income contractions than households whose head had some higher education, a finding 
that concurs with the literature. Although households with a university degree also appear 
to have suffered income losses of around 4%, this finding is not statistically significant 
because of the large standard errors.  
The crisis in El Salvador most severely impacted employers. However, the large standard 
errors make it difficult to assess the reliability of this finding. Nevertheless, the huge dif-
ference between employers and self-employed workers is striking. It would be interesting 
to analyse this subgroup more thoroughly.  
2 07 20 9 
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Table 7: Change in monthly per capita income by socio-demographic characteristics  
in El Salvador 
 
2007 2009 Percentage 
change T-test mean std. error mean std. error 
Demographics of household head 
male  286.46 12.05 280.56 9.88 -2.06%  
female 259.63 8.79 232.47 4.92 -10.46% *** 
under 30 281.46 13.40 268.63 10.11 -4.56%  
30–44 290.19 12.90 273.66 10.07 -5.70% * 
45–64 298.87 14.24 282.55 11.23 -5.46% * 
over 65 209.80 6.43 207.95 7.82 -0.88%  
Education level of main income provider 
no diploma 191.50 3.72 177.35 2.37 -7.39% *** 
basic education  240.34 5.68 239.15 9.24 -0.49%  
secondary education  336.06 8.98 328.27 9.62 -2.32%  
tertiary education 695.36 56.68 665.77 32.83 -4.25%  
Employment of main income provider 
Employer 510.32 44.34 424.67 28.59 -16.78% ** 
self-employed 219.27 5.49 216.23 5.73 -1.39%  
employed with work contract 432.42 27.25 428.25 16.99 -0.96%  
employed without work contract 214.15 6.44 204.05 6.77 -4.72% * 
no access to social security 217.75 3.90 207.11 3.77 -4.89% ** 
with access to social security 432.61 25.28 417.11 18.38 -3.58%  
Household reliance on transfers 
no migrating household member 267.43 8.88 258.98 7.15 -3.16% * 
with migrating household member 317.17 18.22 290.84 15.24 -8.30% * 
no social assistance 276.28 9.77 271.81 7.69 -1.62%  
with social assistance 288.10 23.46 201.68 12.27 -30.00% *** 
 
Notes: Values in constant 2005 international $ (PPP) 
 *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05 
Source: DIGESTYC (2008 / 2010) 
Within the employed population, those with no work contracts and no access to social 
security seem to have suffered more than others during the crisis. Income for households 
whose main income provider was employed with a contract changed by only -0.96%, a 
difference that is not statistically significantly different from zero. In contrast, income in 
households whose main income provider was employed without a contract fell by 4.72%; 
the difference is significant at the 5% level.  
Finally, household reliance on transfers seems to explain some variation in the micro-level 
effects of the crisis. Households with migrating household members suffered more pro-
nounced declines in monthly income (Table 7). This finding is in line with the results 
above. Households with access to social assistance in the form of pensions or cash trans-
fers faced an average decrease in monthly income of about 30.0%. However, access to 
social assistance was not constant over time and during the crisis, the share of households 
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who received transfers increased from 6.2% to 11.2% of the population, as a result of scaled 
up social spending in 2008 and 2009. The reduction in average income for households with 
access to social assistance is therefore a sign of the efficient targeting of additional funds. In 
fact, as shown earlier, the share of social assistance in overall income for the lowest income 
decile increased from 4.7% to 8.4%, which corresponds to an average increase from US$ 
2.3 to US$ 3.4 per capita (in international PPP). Unfortunately, these additional transfers 
could not fully compensate for losses in income from other sources.  
In El Salvador, lower-income households were more severely affected than others by the 
economic and financial crisis. And it appears that poorer households suffered from the 
crisis irrespective of their social characteristics: there is much less variation across catego-
ries for the poorest 30% of the population than for the whole sample. Table 8 shows in-
come trends for the lowest three income deciles disaggregated by socio-demographic 
characteristics. The results are discussed in more detail below. 
Demographics do not seem to have determined the differences in microeconomic effects 
of the crisis within the poorest 30% of the population. In the lowest three deciles, female-
headed households did not suffer greater declines in income than male-headed households: 
both groups faced income contractions of similar magnitudes. For the lowest three deciles, 
households with pension-age and working-age heads were similarly affected by the finan-
cial crisis.  
As for the whole population, less-educated households within the poorest three deciles were 
most affected by the crisis. However, differences here were less pronounced than for the 
whole sample. In contrast to the population average, households whose principle income pro-
vider had completed secondary education suffered an above-average loss of income.  
Employment status seems to explain many of the differences in crisis impact at the micro-
level. On average, households with main income providers who were self-employed suf-
fered more severe income losses than households whose main income providers were em-
ployed. Income loss was greatest for employers (e.g. entrepreneurs who use hired labour), 
who suffered income losses of about 19.4% on average (Table 8). Informal entrepreneurs 
faced income contractions of about 12.0%. In comparison, the income losses of approxi-
mately 5.0% for employees without work contracts and 6.3% for employees with work 
contracts seem quite modest. Unlike what was observed for the whole sample, households 
with stable jobs – characterised by access to social security and employment contracts – 
faced higher income losses than households with unstable job situations. The differences, 
however, were slight.  
Finally, household reliance on transfers accounted for fewer microeconomic effects of the 
crisis among the poorer parts of the population than in the whole sample: There was virtu-
ally no difference in the change of income for households with, and without, migrating 
household members. In addition, the difference in income changes for households with 
access to social assistance and households without social assistance was much smaller for 
the poorest than for the whole group (-13.1%, compared with -8.9%). This is especially 
surprising in view of the fact that the share of households who received social assistance 
increased from 7.6% in 2007 to 18.6% (of the poorest 30% of the population) in 2009, an 
increase that is much greater than for the population as a whole. It seems reasonable to 
conclude that during the global economic and financial crisis, increased social spending at 
least partly helped to cushion the effects of the crisis on the poorest people of El Salvador.  
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Table 8: Change in monthly income per capita by socio-demographic characteristics of the 
poorest 30% of the population in El Salvador 
 
2007 2009 Percentage 
change T-test Mean std. error Mean std. error 
Demographics of household head 
male  79.37 0.71 70.64 0.59 -11.00% *** 
female 82.63 0.84 74.60 0.73 -9.73% *** 
under 30 81.63 1.57 76.15 1.11 -6.71% *** 
30-44 82.03 0.92 73.86 0.75 -9.96% *** 
45-64 81.35 0.93 70.56 0.83 -13.27% *** 
over 65 76.51 1.09 69.23 0.85 -9.51% *** 
Education of main income provider 
no diploma 78.34 0.62 69.65 0.52 -11.09% *** 
basic education 85.58 1.53 80.17 1.27 -6.33% *** 
secondary education  94.56 1.43 82.69 1.50 -12.55% *** 
tertiary education 86.59 4.20 86.22 5.61 -0.43%  
Employment of main income provider 
employer 74.78 2.08 60.24 1.89 -19.44% *** 
self-employed 77.87 1.10 68.51 0.87 -12.03% *** 
employed with work contract 96.83 1.62 90.77 1.20 -6.26% *** 
employed without work contract 82.82 0.89 78.60 0.64 -5.09% *** 
no access to social security 79.48 0.69 72.29 0.58 -9.05% *** 
with access to social security 96.52 1.24 89.20 0.98 -7.58% *** 
Household reliance on transfers 
no migrating household member 79.74 0.63 71.37 0.53 -10.49% *** 
with migrating household member 84.75 1.15 76.13 1.00 -10.17% *** 
no social assistance 81.00 0.59 73.81 0.51 -8.88% *** 
with social assistance 73.62 2.19 63.95 1.18 -13.13% *** 
 
Notes: Values in constant 2005 international $ (PPP) 
 *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05 
Source: DIGESTYC (2008 / 2010) 
3.3 Tajikistan 
Tajikistan is a low income country in Central Asia, where in 2007 the poverty headcount 
ratio (US$ 2 a day in PPP) was about 37.0% (World Bank 2012). The economy relies 
heavily on a few export products as well as on remittances inflows, a structure that made 
the country vulnerable to the 2007 food price crisis as well as to the economic and finan-
cial crisis of 2008 and 2009. 
Tajikistan was strongly affected by the economic and financial crisis – not only through 
reduced investment and remittances inflows, but also through the depreciation of foreign 
assets. These effects deeply impacted at the micro-level, but seem to have affected macro-
economic performance to only a limited extent. Positive GDP per capita growth rates ob-
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served at the macroeconomic level were in sharp contrast to strong income contractions at 
the household level.13 Sections 3.3.1 and 3.3.1 describe the macro- and microeconomic 
effects of the crisis in Tajikistan. 
3.3.1 Macroeconomic effects and policy responses 
Tajikistan is the only country analysed here that continued to experience positive growth 
rates during the crisis. The GDP per capita growth did not decelerate until 2010, and even 
then it remained positive, at 2.4%. During the crisis, GDP per capita grew by 6.4%. The 
difference in GDP per capita growth rates14 was also positive, albeit minimal. Neverthe-
less, we included Tajikistan in our analysis because it was affected by the crisis through 
reductions in investment and remittances inflows. 
The remittances and investment channels were the main channels through which the 
global crisis was transmitted to Tajikistan. While net foreign assets fell by 72.4% in 2008, 
their small share of the 2007 GDP (5.4%) makes it unlikely that this large drop had major 
repercussions at the micro-level. Investment inflows had a bigger role in the overall 
economy, contributing 9.7% to GDP. While the amount of investment inflows continued 
to grow positively throughout 2008, in 2009, it nearly halved. Exports contributed 
20.6% to the 2007 GDP and continued to grow at positive rates in 2008 and 2009. ODA 
– 6.1% of GDP in 2007 – also continued to increase throughout the crisis. Remittances 
seem to have been the most important channel through which the economy was affected 
by the economic and financial crisis. The share of remittances in GDP was put at 45.5% 
in 2007, and although remittances grew at positive rates in 2008, in 2009, they fell by 
31.2%. It is expected that mostly the higher income groups would have felt the sharp 
drop in net foreign assets, while the reduction of remittances inflows may have affected 
almost all groups. 
Tajikistan’s fiscal deficit had been increasing since 2007 in light of the global crisis and 
peaked at 5.2% of GDP in 2009. As we can see in Figure 14, it has been preceded by a 
long period of quasi balanced budget. 
In response to the crisis, Tajikistan cut the corporate income tax to stimulate investment 
(Brownbridge / Canagarajah 2009). The country also revised spending priorities along 
three main principles: first, social spending would be increased to maintain the delivery of 
key public services; second, social spending would be prioritised for the most vulnerable 
groups; and third, unnecessary and low priority expenditures should be scaled back 
(World Bank 2010c).  
 
                                                            
13  This contrast is not easy to explain. It could be due to the direct effect of remittances on household 
income that became visible earlier at the micro- than at the macro-level. However, data quality could 
be a problem. The Tajikistan LSMS has a very small sample size (especially in 2009) and despite being 
designed to ensure national representativeness, in such small samples even minor errors in sampling 
and weighting can lead to biased estimates.  
14  The difference in GDP per capita growth rates is the difference between the growth rate in 2009 and 
the average growth rate from 1997 to 2007. 
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Figure 14: General government revenue and expenditure in Tajikistan 
 
Notes: Values in constant 1997 Tajik Somoni, in millions 
Source: IMF (2011) 
3.3.2 Microeconomic effects 
Although GDP per capita growth in Tajikistan remained positive throughout the economic 
and financial crisis, household-level data suggest strong welfare losses for all income dec-
iles, with wealthier parts of the population more strongly affected by the financial crisis 
than poorer households. Drops in labour and remittances income caused strong income 
losses for wealthier households. Lower income deciles in Tajikistan were also strongly 
affected by the crisis – although mainly as a result of reduced social spending and reduc-
tions in private transfers and remittances. Apparently, the transfer channel was relevant for 
all parts of the population, whereas contractions in labour income affected mainly the 
wealthier households. 
As for the role of social characteristics, households with older heads and household heads 
with less education tended to be more strongly affected by the crisis. In addition, entrepre-
neurs with and without hired labour were slightly more affected than employees. Within 
the population that was employed, income contractions were similar for formal and infor-
mal workers. During the crisis, the share of households in formal employment decreased 
while the share of households with jobs in the informal sector increased (where wage lev-
els are lower). This suggests that many households experienced deteriorating working 
conditions and reduced income through switching from the formal to the informal sector. 
These findings are elaborated below.  
Changes in income by deciles 
In Tajikistan, all income deciles faced strong contractions in income, which is very surprising 
since during the crisis, GDP per capita continued to grow at positive rates. It is difficult to 
detect which groups were most affected, because all changes were of similar magnitudes. It 
seems that the richer groups – if any – faced higher income contractions (Table 9). 
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Table 9: Change in monthly per capita income by income deciles in Tajikistan 
Income deciles 
2007 2009 Percentage 
change T-test mean std. error mean std. error 
1 27.08 0.73 15.25 0.64 -43.70% *** 
2 72.57 0.71 32.47 0.39 -55.25% *** 
3 113.33 0.63 46.08 0.36 -59.34% *** 
4 154.93 0.59 59.23 0.37 -61.77% *** 
5 201.75 0.69 74.40 0.52 -63.12% *** 
6 256.02 0.89 93.06 0.59 -63.65% *** 
7 322.13 1.27 119.50 0.88 -62.90% *** 
8 429.21 1.94 156.21 1.30 -63.60% *** 
9 628.36 4.73 217.63 2.18 -65.37% *** 
10 1565.92 69.61 435.00 17.73 -72.22% *** 
Total  377.01 12.83 124.67 4.06 -66.93% *** 
 
Notes: Values in constant 2005 international $ (PPP) 
 *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05 
Source: World Bank / Tajstat (2008 / 2010)  
 
Table 10: Change in monthly per capita income from labour by income deciles in Tajikistan 
Income deciles 
2007 2009 Percentage 
change T-test Mean std. error mean std. error 
1 7.98 0.93 6.71 0.72 -15.93%  
2 31.12 1.76 18.06 1.11 -41.98% *** 
3 61.98 2.90 24.93 1.53 -59.77% *** 
4 90.08 3.62 30.94 1.75 -65.65% *** 
5 121.55 3.82 38.98 2.43 -67.93% *** 
6 166.45 4.70 46.28 3.14 -72.19% *** 
7 204.21 6.11 63.41 3.46 -68.95% *** 
8 251.73 9.06 72.60 4.83 -71.16% *** 
9 350.57 12.84 91.25 6.97 -73.97% *** 
10 699.55 65.85 179.72 15.07 -74.31% *** 
Total 198.47 8.81 57.19 2.48 -71.18% *** 
 
Notes: Values in constant 2005 international $ (PPP) 
 *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05 
Source: World Bank / Tajstat (2008 / 2010)  
Differences in income changes between the deciles were most pronounced for labour in-
come (Table 10). The first decile suffered the least change (the only change that is not 
statistically significant) in income from labour market activities and self-employed busi-
nesses. All other deciles experienced large contractions in labour income, whereby the size 
of this effect appeared to increase with income. 
For most other income sources, large and statistically significant declines were found  
over all deciles (not reported here). Income from remittances decreased drastically for all  
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Table 11: Change in monthly per capita income from social assistance by income deciles  
in Tajikistan 
Income deciles 
2007 2009 Percentage 
change T-test mean std. error Mean std. error 
1 5.11 0.50 2.34 0.38 -54.12% *** 
2 7.88 0.81 3.25 0.54 -58.74% *** 
3 7.89 0.93 5.40 0.83 -31.57% * 
4 10.06 1.13 5.62 0.86 -44.16% *** 
5 10.78 1.43 6.48 1.27 -39.93% ** 
6 9.94 1.07 7.56 1.26 -23.90%  
7 13.19 1.29 5.53 0.97 -58.05% *** 
8 16.32 2.35 8.36 1.86 -48.75% ** 
9 15.37 1.80 11.18 2.23 -27.25%  
10 15.20 1.88 9.35 2.75 -38.53% * 
Total 11.17 0.57 6.50 0.50 -41.78% *** 
 
Notes: Values in constant 2005 international $ (PPP) 
 *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05 
Source: World Bank / Tajstat (2008 / 2010)  
deciles and income from agricultural production also. Unlike in El Salvador, it was not 
possible to compensate for losses in income from remittances and labour market activities. 
Income from social assistance also decreased, with the contraction apparently most pro-
nounced for the poorer parts of the population. Table 11 shows that the first two deciles 
faced an above-average contraction in income from social assistance, as did the fourth, 
seventh and eighth deciles. Although the trend is unclear, it appears that in Tajikistan cuts 
in public spending most affected the most vulnerable groups.  
As in El Salvador, the crisis in Tajikistan affected poorer households differently from wealth-
ier households. This becomes apparent when income structures for the lowest and the highest 
income deciles before and after the crisis are compared (Figures 15 and 16). In Tajikistan, the 
poorest income decile was more affected through decreasing remittances and private transfers 
than through the labour market. The share of labour income in total income increased from 
29.5% in 2007 to 44% in 2009, although in real terms it contracted. At the same time, income 
from the remaining sources decreased disproportionally. Respectively, the shares of income 
from remittances and from private transfers decreased from 4.9% in 2007 to 0.7% in 2009, 
and from 5.1 in 2007 to 1.5% in 2009. In the same period, the share of agricultural production 
and social assistance also decreased, from 37.2% to 27.3% and from 18.9% to 15.4% respec-
tively. Finally, the share in income from other sources greatly increased – from 1% to 10.6% – 
whereas labour income obtained through seasonal migration (income from working abroad) 
remained negligible in 2007 and 2009. 
At the higher end of the income distribution, the effects of the crisis were mainly felt 
through drastic reductions in income from remittances, but also by losses in labour in-
come. While the share of labour income in total income remained fairly constant, in real 
terms it contracted by 74.3%. Remittances dropped for the highest income decile, reducing 
their share in total income from 32.5% in 2007 to 19% in 2009. However, richer house-
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holds seem to have offset losses in remittances by continuing to migrate: the share of in-
come from working abroad increased from 6.6% in 2007 to 24.3% in 2009, although in 
real terms it increased only slightly – from US$ 103.5 to US$ 105.7 (PPP). Agricultural 
production seems to have played only a minor role in household income, with its share 
dropping from 9.8% to 3.2% of the total monthly income.  
Figure 15: Income composition of the lowest income decile in Tajikistan 
 
Notes: Shares of income from different sources in overall income 
Source: World Bank / Tajstat (2008 / 2010)  
 
Figure 16: Income composition of the highest income decile in Tajikistan 
 
Notes: Shares of income from different sources in overall income 
Source: World Bank / Tajstat (2008 / 2010)  
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Changes in income by socio-demographic characteristics  
In Tajikistan, household socio-demographic characteristics did not account for many mi-
croeconomic effects of the crisis. All groups faced statistically significant income reduc-
tions of similar magnitudes. Table 12 gives an overview of the changes in monthly per 
capita income by socio-demographic characteristics.  
In Tajikistan, household demographics seemed to drive only a few of the microeconomic 
effects of the crisis. While the household head’s sex appears not to have influenced the 
degree to which a household suffered income contractions between 2007 and 2009, their 
age might well have been significant. On average, households headed by persons under 
the age of 30 suffered lower contractions in income, while contractions were especially 
pronounced for those headed by persons of pension age (Table 12). 
Table 12: Change in monthly per capita income by socio-demographic characteristics  
in Tajikistan 
 
2007 2009 Percentage 
change T-test mean std. error mean std. error 
Demographics of household head 
male  377.16 14.18 122.74 4.06 -67.46% *** 
female 376.39 30.04 133.75 11.81 -64.46% *** 
under 30 396.85 61.67 202.18 39.00 -49.05% ** 
30–44 380.39 21.08 123.18 7.85 -67.62% *** 
45–64 381.23 15.95 130.07 5.64 -65.88% *** 
over 65 357.44 21.67 105.48 6.40 -70.49% *** 
Education of main income provider 
no diploma 247.70 27.76 96.83 15.35 -60.91% *** 
basic education  331.84 29.81 108.21 10.43 -67.39% *** 
secondary education  392.50 15.53 119.90 4.59 -69.45% *** 
tertiary education 380.16 20.20 154.64 10.74 -59.32% *** 
Employment of main income provider 
employer 391.02 36.48 115.31 23.50 -70.51% *** 
self-employed 487.00 42.73 129.16 9.52 -73.48% *** 
employed with work contract 398.78 18.93 135.48 7.06 -66.03% *** 
employed without work contract 380.82 17.25 116.26 5.11 -69.47% *** 
entitled to sick leave 336.77 14.25 115.61 6.17 -65.67% *** 
not entitled to sick leave 459.49 17.04 133.40 5.20 -70.97% *** 
Household reliance on transfers 
no migrating household  member 324.44 12.05 110.61 4.01 -65.91% *** 
with migrating household  member 693.60 47.93 223.48 13.56 -67.78% *** 
no social assistance 392.12 14.00 128.80 5.31 -67.15% *** 
with social assistance 356.44 17.83 119.52 5.59 -66.47% *** 
 
Notes: Values in constant 2005 international $ (PPP) 
 *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05 
Source: World Bank / Tajstat (2008 / 2010)  
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In contrast, educational background does not much explain the variations in crisis impact 
on households. Households whose main income provider had basic or secondary educa-
tion were only slightly more affected than households whose main income provider had 
tertiary education or no diploma. The differences were minor. A probable explanation for 
the fact that households with little education suffered lower income losses would be the 
lower share of labour income in the total income of households at the lower end of the 
income distribution. However, standard errors in the lowest category are very large, so the 
possibility that households without any diplomas were affected as much or more than all 
other households cannot be excluded. 
Employment status also did not explain the effects observed in Tajikistan. As in El Salva-
dor, self-employed income providers were more affected than those who were employed. 
Losses in per capita income were put at about 70.5% and 73.5% for entrepreneurs with 
and without hired labour. For employees, the data suggest that households whose main 
income providers were employed with a contract and sick leave were better off than those 
with less stable employment. But the changes were relatively small. Due to absent infor-
mation about access to social security, we included the question about entitlement to sick 
leave in our analysis as a way of differentiating between stable and unstable employment.  
Finally, a household’s reliance on transfers does not determine the degree to which it was 
affected by the crisis. The difference in changes in income between households with and 
without a migrating household member was small; the large standard errors in the group 
of households with a migrating household member made interpreting these results diffi-
cult. Compared with the statistics in relation to migrating household members, the differ-
ence in changes in income for households with and without access to social assistance was 
even smaller (Table 12).  
Differences in their socio-demographic characteristics do not appear to have significantly 
influenced the degree to which the poorest three deciles in Tajikistan were affected by the 
global economic and financial crisis. They all suffered comparably. There was even less 
variation between socio-demographic categories within the poorest 30% of the population 
than within the entire population. The size of the effect was similar for all groups –
independent of the category (Table 13).  
Education and access to social assistance seemed to help determine changes in income in 
the poorest three deciles. In this subsample, households whose main income provider had 
tertiary education faced the sharpest income declines, and households with access to social 
assistance fared somewhat better during the crisis than households without. The income of 
the former shrank by 51.9%, while it decreased by 59.3% for households without access to 
social assistance.  
In contrast to our observations for the entire population, in the poorest deciles entrepre-
neurs seemed to be less affected by the economic crisis than employees. Entrepreneurs 
with and without hired labour had income losses of about 54.7% and 57.9% respectively, 
while employees with and without work contracts suffered losses of 59.3% and 60.4%. 
However, these results were not driven by changes in income from entrepreneurial activ-
ity, as is clear when only labour income is considered in Table 14.  
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Table 13:  Change in monthly per capita income by socio-demographic characteristics for the 
poorest 30% of the population in Tajikistan 
 
2007 2009 Percentage 
change T-test mean std. error Mean std. error 
Demographics of household head 
male 72.04 1.53 31.13 0.88 -56.79% ***
female 67.49 2.43 31.36 1.72 -53.53% ***
under 30 63.71 5.97 28.52 6.51 -55.24% ***
30–44 69.57 2.18 30.34 1.44 -56.39% ***
45–64 73.44 1.85 31.16 1.14 -57.57% ***
over 65 69.32 2.59 32.62 1.47 -52.94% ***
Education of main income provider 
no diploma 54.92 4.07 26.64 3.31 -51.50% *** 
basic education 69.23 2.77 30.51 2.03 -55.93% *** 
secondary education 71.62 1.73 31.55 1.00 -55.95% *** 
tertiary education 78.02 2.61 32.42 2.12 -58.44% *** 
Employment of main income provider 
employer 71.25 6.29 32.24 4.79 -54.74% *** 
self-employed 77.11 3.30 32.44 1.82 -57.93% *** 
employed with work contract 84.45 1.74 34.39 1.17 -59.28% *** 
employed without work contract 81.24 2.04 32.16 1.22 -60.41% *** 
entitled to sick leave 86.18 1.78 33.12 0.93 -61.57% *** 
not entitled to sick leave 87.71 2.05 32.92 1.26 -62.47% *** 
Household reliance on transfers 
no migrating household member 70.56 1.40 31.08 0.80 -55.95% *** 
with migrating household member 75.47 3.49 33.76 3.46 -55.27% *** 
no social assistance 72.06 1.62 29.34 0.98 -59.29% *** 
with social assistance 69.69 1.96 33.67 1.06 -51.68% *** 
 
Notes:  Values in constant 2005 international $ (PPP) 
 *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05 
Source: World Bank / Tajstat (2008 / 2010)  
 
Table 14: Change in monthly per capita income from labour by socio-demographic characteris-
tics for the poorest 30% of the population in Tajikistan 
Employment of main income provider 
2007 2009 Percentage 
change T-test Mean std. error mean std. error 
employer 45.96 6.29 12.53 4.21 -72.73% *** 
self-employed 25.04 4.59 19.93 1.91 -20.41%  
employed with work contract 54.47 2.05 22.23 1.30 -59.20% *** 
employed without work contract 47.45 3.23 19.07 1.29 -59.82% *** 
entitled to sick leave 58.11 2.16 19.05 1.02 -67.23% *** 
not entitled to sick leave 63.52 2.33 21.61 1.37 -65.98% *** 
 
Notes: Values in constant 2005 international $ (PPP) 
 *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05 
Source: World Bank / Tajstat (2008 / 2010)  
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In terms of changes in labour income, the group of employers was most harshly hit. 
Their income decreased on average by 70%, compared to 20% for the self-employed 
main income providers. For households whose main income provider was employed, 
the size of income losses apparently was not influenced by a work contract. However, 
per capita incomes were higher for households whose main income provider had a 
work contract and the share of households in formal employment decreased during the 
crisis. From 2007 to 2009, the share of main income providers who were employed 
with work contracts dropped from 40.9% to 37.8%, while the share of employees 
without work contracts rose from 40.8% to 49.2%. Our findings suggest that during the 
crisis, a considerable share of formal employees lost their stable jobs and had to take 
less well paid, and less stable, jobs. It becomes clear, that main income provider’s pos-
session of a work contract did not determine the likelihood of their income shrinking 
during the crisis. As we can also see from Table 14, for the poorest tier of the popula-
tion, entitlement to sick leave had no influence on the size of income losses either.  
3.4 Cambodia 
Cambodia is a low income country that had poverty rates around 60.1% in 2007, measured 
at the poverty line of US$ 2 a day (in PPP, World Bank 2012). Its economy relies heavily 
on garment and tourism exports, two sectors that suffered immensely during the global 
crisis (Jalilian / Reyes 2010). Indeed, Cambodia suffered the sharpest contraction in GDP 
per capita growth in the East Asia and Pacific Region. 
Cambodia was mainly affected by the global economic and financial crisis through the 
wealth, investment and trade channels. Although GDP per capita growth turned negative 
in 2009, the effects of the crisis seem to have only partially trickled down to the micro-
level. Sections 3.4.1 and 3.4.2 provide evidence on the macro- and microeconomic effects 
of the crisis in Cambodia. 
3.4.1 Macroeconomic effects and policy responses 
In the 2000s, Cambodia had experienced pronounced per capita GDP growth at rates be-
tween 5.1% and 11.9%. But in 2008, GDP per capita growth decelerated and in 2009 
turned negative – at -1.03% (World Bank 2012). The difference in GDP per capita growth 
rates was even more pronounced, with a gap of -8.3 percentage points. 
The main channels through which the crisis was transmitted to Cambodia were the wealth, 
investment and trade channels. The share of net foreign assets in GDP was relatively high 
for a low income country (30.1% in 2007). In 2008, the value of these assets fell by 
14.3%, while capital flows, which had a 10.0% share of GDP in 2007, fell by 8.9% in 
2008 and by 34.5% in 2009. Cambodia is also a trade dependent economy: in 2007 ex-
ports contributed about 65.3% to GDP. Despite continuing to grow in 2008, exports fell by 
9.9% in 2009. Transfers did not play an important role in the transmission of the crisis to 
Cambodia. Remittances inflows contributed only 4.1% to GDP in 2007, and while they 
fell by 7.8% in 2008, they recovered in 2009. Although ODA was relatively high in 2007 
(8.2% of GDP), it did not change much during the crisis. 
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Figure 17:  General government revenue and expenditure in Cambodia 
 
Notes: Values in constant 2006 billion Cambodian Riels  
Source: IMF (2011) 
Like most Southeast Asian countries, Cambodia reacted to the economic downturn through 
its fiscal policy, which included tax exemptions and corporate income tax incentives on the 
revenue side, and investment in infrastructure and safety nets as well as support for strategic 
industries and increases in civil service wages on the expenditure side (Parulian 2009). Fig-
ure 17 shows that government revenue decreased in 2009, while government expenditure 
continued to grow. Following three years of fiscal consolidation, the government allowed its 
budget deficit to expand in 2009 in order to provide fiscal stimulus. 
3.4.2 Microeconomic effects  
As of 2009, the effects of the economic and financial crisis seem to have only partially re-
duced household income in Cambodia. After 2007, average income increased in all income 
deciles, although our analysis found a decline in labour income for poorer households. 
Nonetheless, total monthly income continued to grow even in lower income groups that 
were able to compensate losses in labour income by increasing agricultural production and 
boosting income from private transfers.  
Regarding social characteristics, in contrast to Tajikistan and El Salvador, Cambodian 
households with tertiary education performed the worst during the crisis. Income from re-
mittances was relevant for only a very small fraction of the population, although we found 
that households relying on transfers – in the form of remittances and social assistance – per-
formed worse during the crisis than those that did not. 
Changes in income by deciles 
Household per capita monthly income increased in Cambodia between 2007 and 2009. As 
reported in Table 15, the greatest increase in monthly income was in the lowest income decile 
(16.9%). All deciles but the tenth faced increases of similar magnitudes – around 10% to 11%. 
Very large standard errors make reliable statements for the tenth decile impossible.  
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The situation appears more complex when we look at different sources of income. Table 
16 shows that for lower income deciles labour income decreased, but stayed more or less 
constant for the middle deciles and increased for the higher income deciles. Changes are 
only statistically significant for the fifth, seventh, eighth and ninth deciles. Especially in 
the lowest two deciles, large standard errors prevent interpretation of the results. However, 
the trend from large negative to large positive effects is remarkable.  
Households at the lower end of the income distribution seem to have been able to compen-
sate for losses in labour income through additional income sources. In particular increased 
agricultural production and private transfers compensated for these losses and explain why 
even the lower income groups faced an average increase in monthly per capita income 
during the crisis (not reported here). Income from remittances also increased considerably 
from 2007 to 2009 but none of the effects was found to be statistically significant nor was 
there any clear evidence about which groups were the most affected by these changes.15 
Changes in income from social assistance varied considerably between income groups (Table 
17), but without either a clear trend or many statistically significant changes. Income from this 
source was negligible in all income deciles except for the tenth, which indicates that Cambo-
dia had very limited publicly provided social protection, with only a few small and regionally 
limited transfer programmes, and mostly private pension schemes. 
The change in income composition of the poorest decile during the crisis explains why poorer 
households were scarcely affected by the financial crisis: before the crisis erupted,  
labour income played a relatively small role in overall income, and income from remittances 
                                                            
15  Detailed results are not reported here, but are available upon request.  
Table 15: Change in monthly per capita income by income deciles in Cambodia 
Income deciles 
2007 2009 Percentage 
change T-test Mean std. error Mean std. error 
1 6.15 0.21 7.19 0.11 16.86% *** 
2 14.46 0.15 16.08 0.07 11.21% *** 
3 22.08 0.15 24.43 0.08 10.64% *** 
4 30.71 0.17 34.28 0.09 11.62% *** 
5 40.79 0.21 45.55 0.11 11.69% *** 
6 53.46 0.28 58.62 0.13 9.64% *** 
7 67.90 0.30 75.36 0.16 10.99% *** 
8 88.68 0.51 99.11 0.26 11.76% *** 
9 128.20 1.02 142.29 0.53 11.00% *** 
10 438.06 35.43 886.89 235.02 102.46% * 
Total  88.95 4.72 138.98 23.82 56.24% * 
 
Notes: Values in constant 2005 international $ (PPP) 
 *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05 
Source: National Institute of Statistics (2008 / 2010) 
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Table 17: Change in monthly per capita income from social assistance by income deciles in 
Cambodia 
Income deciles 
2007 2009 Percentage 
change T-test mean std. error Mean std. error 
1 0.05 0.02 0.04 0.01 -29.76%  
2 0.07 0.05 0.12 0.03 67.44%  
3 0.05 0.03 0.18 0.04 281.97% ** 
4 0.22 0.12 0.21 0.06 -4.12%  
5 0.10 0.05 0.23 0.05 133.39% * 
6 0.29 0.11 0.55 0.11 91.62%  
7 0.29 0.17 0.28 0.07 -4.73%  
8 0.45 0.21 0.47 0.09 5.14%  
9 0.61 0.20 0.95 0.21 55.38%  
10 2.62 1.01 1.86 0.55 -29.07%  
Total 0.47 0.11 0.49 0.07 2.92%  
 
Notes: Values in constant 2005 international $ (PPP) 
 *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05 
Source: National Institute of Statistics (2008 / 2010) 
was negligible (Figure 18). Agricultural production contributed the lion’s share to house-
hold income in 2007 and 2009, and its share in total income remained more or less con-
stant. 
The income composition of the highest income decile changed considerably be- 
tween 2007 and 2009, suggesting that income from agricultural production also increased 
Table 16: Change in monthly per capita income from labour by income deciles in Cambodia 
Income deciles 
2007 2009 Percentage 
change T-test mean std. error Mean std. error 
1 0.82 0.17 0.75 0.07 -9.55%  
2 3.01 0.38 2.52 0.17 -16.52%  
3 6.96 0.66 6.87 0.33 -1.26%  
4 12.45 0.91 13.37 0.50 7.43%  
5 20.28 1.28 22.69 0.66 11.88% * 
6 31.67 1.48 33.72 0.83 6.44%  
7 37.25 2.56 47.70 0.99 28.06% *** 
8 56.96 2.64 66.15 1.34 16.13% *** 
9 86.73 5.03 100.26 2.09 15.60% *** 
10 340.05 36.68 509.41 98.57 49.80%  
Total 59.55 4.43 80.34 10.18 34.92% * 
 
Notes: Values in constant 2005 international $ (PPP) 
 *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05 
Source:  National Institute of Statistics (2008 / 2010) 
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disproportionally for households at the higher end of the income distribution. However, 
these changes are not representative for other higher income deciles: income composition 
for the seventh, eighth and ninth income deciles remained fairly constant.  
Figure 18:  Income composition for the lowest income decile in Cambodia 
 
Notes: Share of income from different sources in total per capita income 
Source: National Institute of Statistics (2008 / 2010) 
 
Figure 19: Income composition for the highest income decile in Cambodia 
 
Notes: Share of income from different sources in total per capita income 
Source: National Institute of Statistics (2008 / 2010) 
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Changes in income by socio-demographic characteristics 
Socio-demographic characteristics in Cambodia seem to explain some of the variation in 
the crisis impact on households. Table 18 provides an overview of the changes in monthly 
per capita income by socio-demographic characteristics.  
Head of household demographics explain only some of the changes in household income 
during the crisis. Although from 2007 to 2009 income increases were larger for male-
headed households and for households with heads between 30 and 44 and of pension age, 
the standard errors are too large to allow for comparing results between categories. No 
conclusions can be drawn.  
Interestingly, it appears that on average, households with better-educated heads had 
smaller income increases. Not counting household heads without any diplomas, positive 
changes in household income inversely decreased with respect to the household  
heads’ educational level, with changes close to zero for those with tertiary education. This  
Table 18: Change in monthly per capita income by socio-demographic characteristics in Cambodia 
 
2007 2009 Percentage 
change T-test mean std. error Mean std. error 
Demographics of household head 
male 89.11 5.42 146.10 30.01 63.96% * 
female 88.40 7.70 113.05 16.09 27.88%  
under 30 71.78 5.35 97.18 17.50 35.38%  
30–44 80.93 6.03 147.63 54.78 82.42%  
45–64 105.23 9.03 140.67 26.65 33.67%  
over 65 79.59 7.42 163.33 84.92 105.21%  
Education of household head 
no diploma 81.43 6.26 125.09 31.99 53.61%  
basic education 126.82 14.56 233.74 104.28 84.31%  
secondary education 155.59 13.35 206.28 22.29 32.58% * 
tertiary education 330.71 49.65 330.91 42.38 0.06%  
Employment of household head 
employer 693.04 428.67 49.51 14.53 -92.86%  
self-employed 77.85 5.56 133.91 31.45 72.03%  
paid employee 119.34 7.33 126.14 5.55 5.70%  
unpaid family worker 75.31 12.13 147.40 28.24 95.72% ** 
Household reliance on transfers 
no migrating household member 86.08 4.60 136.72 24.87 58.83% * 
with migrating household member 162.21 30.47 187.76 32.59 15.76%  
no social assistance 89.62 5.09 141.37 25.44 57.74% * 
with social assistance 81.86 7.59 104.18 8.68 27.27% * 
 
Notes: Values in constant 2005 international $ (PPP) 
 *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05 
Source: National Institute of Statistics (2008 / 2010) 
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suggests that the best-educated households in Cambodia were unable to improve their 
income between 2007 and 2009 – unlike all the other groups. Taking into account pos-
sible inaccuracies in the price data, this could mean that this group faced negative real 
income growth due to labour market effects of the crisis.  
The role of employment status is more difficult to assess. First, standard errors for the 
estimates of mean income of employers are so large that the estimates cannot be reli-
able.  
The same is true for self-employed heads and for unpaid family workers.16 The only 
category for which estimates seem reasonable is the group of households whose head 
was a paid employee, and for that group, at 5.7% the change in income was small but 
positive. But there are no reliable estimates for comparisons, so no conclusions can be 
drawn about the role of employment status. It is, however, interesting to observe that 
the 2009 estimates indicate a sharp difference between the income of employers and 
that of all other categories. It appears that the income of employers was much lower 
than the income of either informal entrepreneurs or employees. The hypothesis that 
formal employers suffered strongly during the crisis correlates with findings from Ta-
jikistan and El Salvador. 
A household’s reliance on transfers seems to help explain income changes during the 
crisis. Income changes were considerably smaller for households who received remit-
tances – and were thought to have migrating household members or relatives – as well 
as for households who received some sort of social assistance. In addition, the share of 
households receiving assistance decreased slightly – from 8.6% to 6.4% of the popula-
tion. 
Again, it seems useful to look at trends in the lower income deciles only, where in 
most categories, the estimates are more precise than for the entire sample and changes 
in income are more often statistically significant. The results are shown in Table 19 
and discussed below.  
In the poorest tier of the population, male-headed households seem to have fared 
somewhat worse during the crisis than female-headed households, although the differ-
ence in the income changes was relatively small. On average, households with older 
heads seem to have experienced higher income increases.  
Educational level seems to have played only a limited role in determining changes in 
income during the crisis. The change is statistically significant in only one category: 
household heads with no diploma. Although on average, households with higher edu-
cation had larger income increases, the changes were not statistically significant. We 
cannot reject the null-hypothesis that incomes remained constant over that period. 
The employment status of the household head seems to explain why some households 
were more strongly affected by the crisis than others. We found that households with 
                                                            
16  In absence of any information about work contracts, entitlement to sick leave or access to social securi-
ty, the only useful distinction at hand in the Cambodia Socio-Economic Survey was whether an em-
ployee was regularly paid or an unpaid family worker.  
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Table 19: Change in monthly per capita income by socio-demographic characteristics for the 
poorest 30% of the population in Tajikistan 
 
2007 2009 Percentage 
change T-test mean std. error Mean std. error 
Demographics of household head 
male 14.28 0.35 15.85 0.18 10.99% *** 
female 14.01 0.61 16.09 0.30 14.84% *** 
under 30 15.13 0.70 15.53 0.33 2.66%  
30–44 13.53 0.42 15.57 0.25 15.12% *** 
45–64 14.86 0.47 16.30 0.24 9.65% *** 
over 65 13.81 0.75 16.37 0.39 18.52% *** 
Education of household head 
no diploma 14.48 0.36 16.02 0.19 10.63% *** 
basic education 14.08 0.83 15.79 0.54 12.11%  
secondary education 13.51 1.88 15.91 1.02 17.73%  
tertiary education 12.76 1.37 15.01 2.10 17.57%  
Employment of household head 
employer 11.70 - 6.59 1.99 -43.64%  
self-employed 13.95 0.33 15.62 0.18 11.93% *** 
paid employee 16.95 0.80 19.49 0.49 14.93% *** 
unpaid family worker 12.85 1.32 15.04 1.78 17.02%  
Household reliance on transfers 
no migrating household member 14.22 0.31 15.84 0.17 11.46% *** 
with migrating household member 14.84 1.61 18.26 0.85 23.04% * 
no social assistance 14.24 0.31 15.83 0.17 11.12% *** 
with social assistance 13.98 1.42 17.21 0.68 23.07% *** 
 
Notes: Values in constant 2005 international $ (PPP) 
 *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05 
Source: National Institute of Statistics (2008 / 2010) 
self-employed heads were slightly worse off than those with employed heads of 
household. Because there were no observations about the category of employers, no 
inference can be made about this group. No inference can be made for households headed 
by an unpaid family worker, either. Although average income in that group increased by 
17% during the crisis, the change is not statistically significant.  
In contrast to the population average, poorer households with migrating household mem-
bers fared better during the crisis than poorer households without migrating household 
members. The same was true for households with access to social assistance who seem to 
have performed better than households without: for the former, average income increased 
by 23.1% compared with 11.1% for the latter. 
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4 Conclusions 
This paper analysed how the global economic and financial crisis affected the populations 
of three developing countries. In the first part, it explained that the crisis was mostly 
transmitted to developing countries through interruptions in trade and investment flows, 
while reduced remittances inflows played an important role in some countries. The paper 
also highlighted the relevance of countercyclical policies in offsetting some macroeco-
nomic effects of the global crisis. The second part of the paper showed that in developing 
countries that were affected by the crisis, households experienced income losses mainly 
through labour market effects and because of reduced remittances inflows.  
After the crisis erupted, many countries implemented countercyclical fiscal and/or mone-
tary policies to boost internal demand and attract investment. While some countries tried 
to attract foreign investment by cutting taxes or granting tax exemptions, others increased 
government spending and initiated large employment programmes to provide additional 
income opportunities. Still other countries increased social spending. The optimal policy 
mix varies greatly between countries, since it is related to the transmission channels at 
work locally and the country’s initial position in terms of fiscal space and institutional 
capacities.  
The effectiveness of countercyclical policies must be evaluated in terms of their ability to 
protect vulnerable population groups from the effects of the crisis. It will always be diffi-
cult to predict which groups would be most severely affected by a crisis and which strate-
gies would best protect them. It is even more difficult when various transmission channels 
function simultaneously, as during the 2008 economic and financial crisis. The results 
presented above indicate the difficulty in identifying ex-ante – and even ex-post – the 
parts of the population that were affected by the global crisis. This difficulty hinders 
timely government action to protect the most vulnerable groups.  
Countries worldwide attempted to shield their populations from the negative consequences 
of the economic and financial crisis using strategies that were not always successful. 
While it was crucial to know whom to address, many countries also lacked the resources 
and/or institutional framework to reach the identified groups. Policies aiming to attract 
foreign investment can fail, and additional government spending can also fail to reach 
those who most needed help.  
In most developed countries, automatic stabilisers – particularly unemployment insurance – 
were crucial in cushioning the effects of the economic and financial crisis on households. In 
developing countries, too, universal social insurance provision and especially unemploy-
ment insurance would have been the most efficient tool to protect households from unem-
ployment. But providing universal social insurance in developing countries can be very dif-
ficult because of their large informal sectors. In addition, social insurance cannot shield 
households from the loss of income from remittances or the diminishing quality of employ-
ment driven by the decreased demand for labour. It appears that in developing countries, 
social insurance would not have been as effective in protecting households from the conse-
quences of the global crisis as it was in developed countries. 
The question remains: What can developing countries do to protect their populations from 
severe economic shocks such as the global economic and financial crisis?  
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The experiences of the three countries analysed in this paper provide important insights. 
While all three countries expressed willingness to increase social spending during the cri-
sis, they had very different initial conditions. El Salvador was the only country that effec-
tively targeted increased social spending to the most severely affected groups. Although 
additional spending could not fully compensate for losses in labour and remittances in-
come, it is noteworthy that poor households received additional public support. In con-
trast, during the crisis, income from social assistance remained negligible in Cambodia, 
while in Tajikistan, the poorest deciles suffered reductions in social assistance income. 
El Salvador’s experience was a result of two crucial factors: first, the country had a com-
prehensive cash transfer scheme in place before the crisis and second, in view of the de-
veloping crisis, the government increased the number of targeted households. Neither Ta-
jikistan nor Cambodia had functioning comprehensive cash transfers schemes prior to the 
crisis. Although both Cambodia and Tajikistan attempted to shield households from the 
effects of the global economic and financial crisis, the poorest households in these coun-
tries received no additional funds. While El Salvador used its institutional framework to 
deliver additional funds, the absence of pre-existing nationwide transfer schemes in Cam-
bodia and Tajikistan made targeting difficult and led to very mixed results.  
Cash transfers programmes, including public works, are effective in directing additional 
funds to specific groups because they can be expanded in times of crisis. Several coun-
tries, including Ethiopia and Nicaragua, took this approach. Their experience suggests that 
expanded transfers did help protect households from income shocks and prevented the 
populations from adopting adverse coping strategies, such as taking children out of school 
and selling productive assets. Because cash transfer and public works schemes were in 
place before the onset of the crisis, additional funds were delivered through these frame-
works in a timely manner. 
Building up cash transfers schemes in developing countries requires time: institutions 
must be built, and targeting and delivery mechanisms have to be created. This is why such 
schemes should be in place before an economic shock occurs. A good example of the im-
portance of a pre-existing institutional framework in order to reach households in need is 
the Temporary Income Support Program (PATI) in El Salvador. Although it was part of 
the anti-crisis strategy that was formulated in early 2009, and despite the country’s experi-
ence in delivering cash transfers, building this innovative public works scheme from 
scratch took so much time that it only began to operate in March 2011 – two years after 
the crisis (ILO / World Bank 2012).  
The experience of the global economic and financial crisis provides strong arguments for 
creating comprehensive social protection schemes, including cash transfers, in low and mid-
dle income countries. For most low and middle income countries, scaling up existing cash 
transfer schemes seems to be the best option for protecting poor and vulnerable households 
from the negative consequences of economic crises. It is difficult to direct additional social 
spending to those most in need, however, if there are no pre-existing transfer schemes. 
Building up cash transfer schemes ad hoc is much more challenging than extending existing 
ones, although in some cases this strategy could be successful. If no transfer scheme exists, a 
careful assessment should be made of the kind of programme that could be built up, in light 
of the country’s individual financial and administrative capacities. 
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Annex 2 Variable definitions and sources for Chapter 2 
Variable name Definition Source 
Difference in GDP 
per capita growth 
rates 
Real GDP per capita growth rate in 2009 minus the 
average real growth rate 1997–2007 (in percentage 
points). 
World Bank, World 
Development Indica-
tors 
Short-term debt (% of 
total external debt) 
Short-term debt includes all debt having an original 
maturity of one year or less and interest in arrears on 
long-term debt. Total external debt is debt owed to 
non-residents repayable in foreign currency, goods or 
services. Year: 2007. 
World Bank, World 
Development Indica-
tors 
External debt stocks 
(% of Gross national 
income [GNI]) 
Total external debt stocks to gross national income.  
Year: 2007.  
World Bank, World 
Development Indica-
tors 
Total debt service  
(% of GNI) 
Total debt service is the sum of principal repayments 
and interest actually paid in foreign currency, goods, 
or services on long-term debt, interest paid on short-
term debt and repayments (repurchases and charges) to 
the IMF. Year: 2007 
World Bank, World 
Development Indica-
tors 
Financing via int’l 
capital markets  
(% of GDP) 
Financing via international capital markets is the sum 
of gross bond issuance, bank lending and new equity 
placement. Year: 2007. 
World Bank, World 
Development Indica-
tors  
Private capital flows, 
total (% of GDP) 
Private capital flows consist of net foreign direct in-
vestment and portfolio investment. Year: 2007. 
World Bank, World 
Development Indica-
tors 
GDP per capita GDP per capita is gross domestic product divided by 
midyear population. Values in constant 2000 US$, in 
thousands. Year: 2007 
World Bank, World 
Development Indica-
tors 
Net foreign assets  
(% of GDP) 
Net foreign assets are the sum of foreign assets held by 
monetary authorities and deposit money banks, less 
their foreign liabilities. Year: 2007. 
World Bank, World 
Development Indica-
tors 
Exports (% of GDP) Exports of goods and services represent the value of 
all goods and other market services provided to the 
rest of the world. Year: 2007. 
World Bank, World 
Development Indica-
tors 
Imports (% of GDP) Imports of goods and services represent the value of 
all goods and other market services received from the 
rest of the world. Year: 2007. 
World Bank, World 
Development Indica-
tors 
Trade (% of GDP) Trade is the sum of exports and imports of goods and 
services measured as a share of gross domestic prod-
uct. Year: 2007. 
World Bank, World 
Development Indica-
tors 
Net exports  
(% of GDP) 
Net exports represent the difference of exports and 
imports as a share of GDP. Year: 2007. 
World Bank, World 
Development Indica-
tors 
Exports to US & W. 
Europe (% of exports) 
Total exports from the reporting economy to the 
United States and Western Europe. Data are expressed 
as percentage of total exports by the economy. Year: 
2007  
IMF, Direction of 
Trade Statistics 
 
  
Variable name Definition Source 
General government 
gross debt (% of 
GDP) 
Gross debt consists of all liabilities that require pay-
ment or payments of interest and/or principal by the 
debtor to the creditor at a date or dates in the future. 
Year: 2007 
IMF, World Economic 
Outlook Database 
 
Total reserves  
(% of GDP) 
Total reserves comprise holdings of monetary gold, 
special drawing rights, reserves of IMF members held 
by the IMF, and holdings of foreign exchange under 
the control of monetary authorities. Year: 2007. 
World Bank, World 
Development Indica-
tors 
 
General government 
final consumption 
expenditure (annual 
% growth) 
Annual percentage growth of general government final 
consumption expenditure based on constant local cur-
rency. 
World Bank, World 
Development Indica-
tors 
Dummy government 
spending increased 
Dummy that takes the value one if growth of general 
government final consumption expenditure in 2009 
was higher that the growth rate in 2007. 
World Bank, World 
Development Indica-
tors 
Exchange rate regime Dummy that takes the value one if the exchange rate 
regime is de jure flexible. 
IMF, Annual Report 
2009 
Exchange rate flexi-
bility 
Official exchange rate is calculated as an annual aver-
age based on monthly averages (local currency units 
relative to the US$). Our measure compares the differ-
ence of the exchange rate in 2009 and the average 
from 2003 to 2007 relative to 2009. Higher values 
stand for more flexible exchange rates and smaller 
values (close to zero) for less flexible exchange rates. 
This measure only captures observed changes relative 
to the US$. 
World Bank, World 
Development Indica-
tors 
Fuels, ores, metals 
and agricultural raw 
materials exports  
(% of exports)  
The sum of fuels, ores, metals and agricultural raw 
materials exports by the reporting economy. Data are 
expressed as a percentage of total exports by the econ-
omy. Year: 2007 
World Bank, World 
Development Indica-
tors 
Manufactures exports 
(% of exports) 
Data are expressed as a percentage of total exports by 
the economy. Year: 2007 
World Bank, World 
Development Indica-
tors 
Workers' remittances 
and compensation of 
employees, received 
(% of GDP) 
Workers' remittances and compensation of employees 
comprise current transfers by migrant workers and 
wages and salaries earned by non-resident workers. 
Year: 2007 
World Bank, World 
Development Indica-
tors 
Net ODA received  
(% of GNI) 
Net Official Development Assistance is disbursement 
flows (net of repayment of principal) that meet the (De-
velopment Assistance Committee [DAC] definition of 
ODA and are made to countries and territories on the 
DAC list of aid recipients. Year: 2007 
World Bank, World 
Development Indica-
tors 
IBRD loans and IDA 
credits (% of GDP) 
IBRD loans and IDA credits are public and publicly 
guaranteed debt extended by the World Bank Group. 
Year: 2007, 2009 and difference 2009–2007 (in abso-
lute values) 
World Bank, World 
Development Indica-
tors 
  
Annex 3 Variable definitions for Chapter 3 
Dependent variable Tajikistan El Salvador Cambodia 
Income from labour  Income from all working 
activities, including self-
employment (first and 
secondary jobs) as long 
as payment is regular 
Income from all working 
activities, including en-
trepreneurial activities 
(first and secondary jobs) 
Income from employ-
ment (only paid employ-
ees) and monthly income 
from family business 
(output– input) and self-
employed activities  
Income from pri-
vate transfers  
Income from transfers 
(domestic and interna-
tional) from friends and 
family, NGOs, and reli-
gious organisations, in-
cluding child support 
Income from domestic 
remittances (friends and 
family)  
Income from domestic 
remittances 
Income from social 
assistance 
Income from pensions, 
family allowances (in-
cluding unemployment 
benefits and maternity 
leave) and scholarships 
Income from pensions 
and public transfers 
Income from pensions, 
transfers from NGOs and 
other institutions, and 
from stipends and schol-
arships 
Income from remit-
tances 
Income from remittances 
from abroad (only from 
household members) 
Income from remittances 
from abroad (only from 
household members) 
Income from remittances 
from abroad (relatives 
and others) 
Income from agri-
cultural production 
Income from food that 
was produced in the 
household or received as 
a gift17 
Income from agricultural 
production including 
crops, livestock, fish 
cultivation, forestry and 
hunting (output–input)18 
Income from agricultural 
production including 
crops, livestock, fish 
cultivation, forestry and 
hunting (output19–input)  
Income from other 
sources 
Income from rents, sale 
of assets, inheritance, 
lottery, interest rates, 
non-farm household 
enterprise, etc.  
Income from rents, sale 
of assets, inheritance, 
lottery, interest rates, 
dividends, lottery, schol-
arships, etc.  
Income from lottery and 
gambling, bank interests, 
dividends, interest on 
loans to others, gifts 
received and goods re-
ceived through barter 
Income from work-
ing abroad 
Average income from a 
current resident house-
hold member’s previous 
travels abroad (over the 
past 12 months)  
Not included Not included 
Education  
No diploma Main income provider20 
has no diploma 
Main income provider 
has no diploma 
Household head21 has no 
diploma 
                                                            
17 A specific section on agricultural production was included only in 2007, not in 2009. 
18 If a household’s monthly income from agricultural production was less than zero, it was recoded as zero. 
19 Output includes the value of products consumed by the household, given as gifts and sold.  
20 Main income provider refers to the person in the household who receives the highest wage, either for 
self-employed or for employed occupations (excluding agricultural production in El Salvador).  
21  Education refers to the household head, because the main income provider cannot be identified for 
Cambodia. If the household head reports not working at all (not even self-employed), then the next 
household member who claims to be working (either employed or self-employed) has been selected.  
  
Dependent variable Tajikistan El Salvador Cambodia 
Basic education Main income provider 
completed years 1–9 
Main income provider 
completed years 1–9 
Household head com-
pleted years 1–9 
Secondary educa-
tion  
Main income provider 
completed years 1–11, 
and/or technical diploma 
Main income provider 
completed years 1–12, 
and/or technical diploma 
Household head com-
pleted years 1–12, and/or 
technical diploma 
Tertiary education  Main income provider 
completed at least 3 years 
of higher education (col-
lege undergraduate, B.A., 
etc.) 
Main income provider 
completed at least 3 years 
of higher education (col-
lege undergraduate, B.A., 
etc.) 
Household head com-
pleted at least 3 years of 
higher education (college 
undergraduate, B.A., etc.) 
Employment status in main job 
Formal employer Main income provider is 
self-employed22 with 
hired labour 
Main income provider is 
self-employed with hired 
labour 
Household head is em-
ployer 
Self-employed  Main income provider is 
self-employed23 without 
hired labour 
Main income provider is 
self-employed24 without 
hired labour 
Household head is self-
employed or own-
account worker 
Formal employee Main income provider is 
employed with work 
contract 
Main income provider is 
employed with work 
contract 
Household head is paid 
employee 
Informal employee Main income provider is 
employed without work 
contract (including un-
paid workers in family 
business) 
Main income provider is 
employed without work 
contract (including un-
paid workers in family 
business) 
Household head is unpaid 
worker in family business 
Access to social 
security  
Not included Main income provider is 
affiliated with social 
security scheme 
Not included 
Entitled to sick 
leave 
Main income provider is 
entitled to sick leave 
Not included Not included 
Reliance on transfers 
With social assis-
tance 
Household has positive 
income from assistance, 
pensions or scholarships 
Household has positive 
income from assistance 
or pensions 
Household has positive 
income from assistance, 
pensions or scholarships 
With migrating 
household member 
Household has at least 
one member who is cur-
rently working abroad 
Household has at least 
one member who is cur-
rently living abroad 
Household receives re-
mittances from abroad  
                                       
                                                            
22 Self-employed workers are persons who are the sole or joint owners of the unincorporated enterprises 
where they work, excluding those unincorporated enterprises that are classified as quasi-corporations 
(OECD Glossary of Statistical Terms). 
23 Education refers to the household head, because the main income provider cannot be identified for 
Cambodia. If the household head reports not working at all (not even self-employed), then the next 
household member who claims to be working (either employed or self-employed) has been selected. 
24 Self-employed workers are persons who are the sole or joint owners of the unincorporated enterprises 
where they work, excluding those unincorporated enterprises that are classified as quasi-corporations 
(OECD Glossary of Statistical Terms). 
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